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l. INTRODUCTION 
In August 2001, the House of Delegates of the American Bar 
Association (ABA) voted in favor of a revision to the duty of 
confidentiality contained in the ABA' s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, a set of ethics rules that has been adopted in some form by 
over forty states. Specifically, the House voted to broaden the exception 
in Model Rule 1.6 that permits a lawyer to reveal confidential 
information of the client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes 
necessary to prevent likely death or substantial bodily harrn.1 It is 
uncertain whether that vote will have any effect on the duty of 
confidentiality in California. This is because California, which has not 
adopted the Model Rules, has the strictest duty of confidentiality of any 
state: it is the duty of every lawyer "[t]o maintain inviolate the 
confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the 
secrets, of his or her client."2 Alone among the states, California has no 
express exceptions to its duty of confidentiality.3 Accordingly, California 
I. At the ABA's annual meeting in Chicago on August 7, 2001, the revisions to 
the exception in the Model Rule of Professional Conduct l.6(b)(l) prevailed by a vote of 
243 to 184. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001); Jonathan D. 
Glater, Lawyers May Reveal Secrets of Clients, Bar Group Rules, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 
2001, at Al2. 
2. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 6068(e) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002). 
3. Although California's attorney-client privilege, contained in California 
Evidence Code section 954, has exceptions, see CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 956-962 (West 
1995), the privilege is not coterminous with the duty of confidentiality. See infra notes 
309 
is also the only state that does not have an express bodily harm 
exception to the duty. 
What precisely is meant by allowing a lawyer to disclose confidential 
information to prevent likely death or serious bodily harm? Consider, 
for example, the following hypothetical scenario adapted from the 
Restatement (Third) of the La,w Governing Lczwyers: 
Client seeks legal advice from Lawyer about client's dismissal from a 
maintenance position by Landlord and eviction from his apartment. Client, 
visibly angry, reveals that he has set a timed device to bum down the building. 
Lawyer knows there are people living in the building. Despite Lawyer's 
attempts to persuade him, Client refuses to take any action to prevent the fire or 
to warn others.4 
In the foregoing situation, the lawyer has knowledge derived from his 
client's confidential communication that death or substantial bodily injury 
is likely to result. A person not trained in the law ( or at least not an avid 
viewer of legal-themed television shows) would probably assume that the 
lawyer would disclose the information to prevent the client from causing 
the described harm. In fact, the duty of confidentiality in every state but 
California has an express exception that would allow such a disclosure. 
This Article takes the position that it is finally time for California to 
make an unambiguous statement that under appropriate circumstances-
a client's criminal actions that will likely result in death or serious bodily 
harm-a lawyer may reveal confidential client information to the extent 
necessary to prevent that harm. True, the duty of confidentiality is one 
of the core duties of the legal profession, fashioned over time to help 
ensure the strong attorney-client relationship that is essential to the 
effective operation of our legal system. It prohibits lawyers from disclosing 
confidential information about their clients, regardless of source.5 Yet, 
under the compelling circumstances where the client is engaging in 
criminal activity likely to result in death or serious bodily harm, public 
policy considerations should outweigh the duty and permit-not 
require-the lawyer to disclose confidential information. 
Although there are persuasive arguments that certain California 
statutes and case law impliedly permit lawyers to reveal confidential 
information where life-threatening criminal activity is present,6 the law 
regarding confidentiality remains uncertain. The recent approval by the 
27-37 and accompanying text (explaining the difference between the duty of 
confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege). There is uncertainty whether those 
exceptions apply equally to the duty of confidentiality. See infra Part III. 
4. REsTATEMENT(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS§ 66 illus. 2 (1998). 
5. See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (explaining the scope of the duty 
of confidentiality). 
6. See infra Part III. 
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ABA' s Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
(Ethics 2000 Commission) of a broader exception than most states 
currently have, as well as the recent publication of the Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, places Business and Professions 
Code section 6068(e)'s absolute terms in even starker contrast than in 
the past. The time has come for either the California Supreme Court, the 
California Legislature, or both working in concert to unequivocally 
permit lawyers to act in these circumstances. 
Part Il of this Article provides background on the duty of confidentiality 
and distinguishes it from the attorney-client privilege. It also describes 
the duty and its bodily harm exception as it exists in jurisdictions other 
than California. It concludes with a discussion of the changes to the 
exception proposed by the Ethics 2000 Commission. Part ill then 
considers the relationship of the duty of confidentiality to the attorney-
client privilege in California, concluding that a bodily harm exception 
cannot be inferred from either the language or statutory scheme of the 
privilege, nor can it be inferred from California case law. Part ill also 
explains why California needs to have an express exception that would 
allow a lawyer to prevent a client's life-threatening criminal activity. 
Part IV discusses the nature and scope such an exception should take, 
concluding that it should authorize rather than mandate disclosure and 
also that criminal action should be a predicate to a lawyer disclosing 
confidential information. Finally, Part V considers various strategies for 
implementing an exception to the duty of confidentiality. After first 
discussing the several previous attempts to modify the statutory duty of 
confidentiality through a rule of professional conduct, it concludes that 
the preferred approach is to transfer the duty from the statute, where it 
currently resides, to a rule and create exceptions to the rule. 
Il. THE MODEL RULES, ETHICS 2000, AND THE RESTATEMENT OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LA WYERS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE DUTY OF 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The duty of confidentiality is one of the core duties lawyers owe to 
their clients, the performance of which permits an effective lawyer-client 
relationship, which in tum is central to the effective operation of our 
adversarial legal system. The duty of confidentiality operates to create a 
relationship of trust between client and lawyer: if the client feared the 
lawyer would later reveal the client's information, the client would not 
provide the kind of information-often damaging to the client's case-
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the lawyer requires to adequately advise or to zealously advocate for the 
client.7 
Given its central role in our legal system, it might be expected that the 
duty would be absolute; only where a client was assured that his 
communications with his lawyer were sacrosanct would the client 
disclose damaging or embarrassing information to the lawyer. Indeed, 
California's duty of confidentiality, set out in the Business and 
Professions Code section 6068(e), is, by its express terms, absolute.8 It 
provides no exceptions to its stated duty. Other jurisdictions, however, 
have adopted exceptions to the duty of confidentiality. This Part 
discusses the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality that other 
jurisdictions have adopted, as well as revisions to those exceptions 
proposed by the recently-published Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers and the Ethics 2000 Commission. While a number 
of exceptions are described, the focus will be on the character and scope 
of the exception concerning life-threatening activity by a client. 
At present, all of the states except California have adopted either the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) or the ABA 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (ABA Code) in some form.9 
7. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 4 (2001) ("A 
fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain 
confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The client is thereby 
encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or 
legally damaging subject matter."). 
A note is in order concerning the nomenclature the author applies throughout this 
Article. References to the "current" Model Rules refer to the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct as adopted by the ABA in 1983, and later adopted by over forty 
states, some with modifications, as those states' code of lawyer ethics. This distinction 
is drawn because in February, 2002, at the ABA's 2002 mid-year meeting, the ABA 
House of Delegates voted to approve all of the rules, as amended, that the Ethics 2000 
Commission submitted for approval. Together with the rules the House of Delegates had 
approved at the ABA's August 2001 annual meeting, the House of Delegates had voted 
on all of the proposed revised rules the Ethics 2000 Commission had submitted for its 
consideration with the exception of Rules 5.5 and 8.5, whose consideration was withheld 
pending their review by the ABA's Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice. See Ctr. 
for Prof! Responsibility, American Bar Ass'n, Ethics 2000-February 2000 Repon 
(Feb. 2002), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-202report_summ.html [hereinafter Ethics 
2000]; see also Conference Repon: ABA Midyear Meeting, 18 ABA LAWYERS MANUAL 
ON PROF'L CONDUCT, 99-100 (2002). In one sense, then, because the House of 
Delegates is the policy-making body of the ABA, the rules the House approved in 
August 2001 and February 2002 arguably are the current Model Rules. However, as no 
state has yet adopted this recently-approved version of the Model Rules, the 1983 Model 
Rules are referred to herein as the current Model Rules. 
8. California Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) provides that it is 
the duty of every California lawyer "[t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every 
peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client." CAL. Bus. & 
PROF. CODE§ 6068(e) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002). 
9. See Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc., Ethics Rules on Client 
Confidences (2000), reprinted in THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODEL 
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At a minimum, these states permit a lawyer to reveal client information 
to prevent death or serious bodily injury.10 Again, only California has 
no exception to the duty of confidentiality that would allow a lawyer to 
take steps to prevent life-threatening acts by the lawyer's client. 11 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND 
OTHER SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY 134-51 app. A (2001). 
Forty-two states and the District of Columbia have adopted some form of the Model 
Rules; seven states have adopted the AB A's Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 
California has its own rules. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2000). 
The legal profession is self-regulated, primarily through the various codes of 
professional conduct the states have adopted during this century. The codes, which 
generally set forth minimally acceptable conduct for lawyers, are a means for 
determining a lawyer's liability for professional discipline. For a general discussion of 
the regulation of the legal profession, see Kevin E. Mohr, Legal Ethics and A Civil 
Action, 23 SEATILEU. L. REV. 283, 287-89 (1999). 
10. Under Disciplinary Rule 4-10l(C)(3) of the Model Code, a lawyer may reveal 
"[t]he intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent 
the crime." By its terms then, DR 4-101 includes within its ambit substantial bodily 
injury or death. Most states that have adopted the Model Rules have kept the Model 
Rules' discretionary language. See, e.g., ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 
1.6(b)(l) (1999) ("A lawyer may reveal a confidence or secret to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary .... " (emphasis added)). Some states provide that a 
lawyer "shall" or "must'' disclose client information to prevent death or substantial 
bodily injury. See, e.g., ARlz. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b) (1997) ("A lawyer 
shall reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to 
prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to 
result in death or substantial bodily harm." (emphasis added)). New Mexico's rule is 
hortatory in nature. See N.M. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 16-106(B) (2001) ("To 
prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to 
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm, a lawyer should reveal such 
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary." (emphasis added)). 
11. That California has no exception is not for want of trying. On several 
occasions, the California State Bar has unsuccessfully proposed a rule of professional 
conduct that would permit lawyers to reveal confidential client information to prevent a 
client from committing a criminal act that is reasonably certain to result in death or 
substantial bodily harm. See infra notes 238-49 and accompanying text. The state bar's 
inability to push forward an exception is probably due less to an aversion on the part of 
the bar's members or the California Supreme Court to such exceptions as it is to 
California's unique system of lawyer regulation. Unlike other states where a lawyer's 
duty of confidentiality is set out in a professional discipline rule, in California the duty is 
found in a statute, California Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). Section 
6068(e) provides that it is the duty of California lawyers to "maintain inviolate the 
confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her 
client." This sui generis professional regulatory system-regulating lawyers' conduct by 
both statutes and rules-has, as we shall see, played a major role in California being the 
only state without a life-threatening criminal activity exception to its duty of 
confidentiality. See infra notes 72-76, 238-49 and accompanying text. 
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A. Current Regulatory Regimes Concerning Confidentiality: 
The Model Rules and the ABA Code 
Current Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, entitled "Confidentiality 
of Information," provides that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information 
relating to [the] representation." 12 This prohibition on disclosures is 
limited by several exceptions. 13 One exception is disclosure with client 
consent and another is "disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order 
to carry out the representation."14 A third exception, the one with which 
this Article is mainly concerned, is that a lawyer may reveal information 
related to the representation "to the extent the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary ... to prevent the client from committing a criminal 
act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or 
substantial bodily harm." 15 Before proceeding with a discussion of this 
12. In its entirety, Model Rule l.6(a), provides: "A lawyer shall not reveal 
information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after 
consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b)." For a discussion of the meaning 
and scope of the term "relating to representation," see infra notes 20-26 and 
accompanying text. 
13. In addition to client-consented and impliedly authorized disclosures in 
paragraph (a), paragraph (b) of Model Rule 1.6 provides: 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer 
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or 
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy 
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge 
or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was 
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the 
lawyer's representation of the client. 
MODELRULESOFPROF'LC0NDUCT R. l.6(b) (2001). 
14. Comments 7 and 8 to Model Rule 1.6, explain what is intended by the 
"impliedly authorized" language in paragraph (a): 
[7] A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client 
when appropriate in carrying out the representation, except to the extent that 
the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority. In 
litigation, for example, a lawyer may disclose information by admitting a fact 
that cannot properly be disputed, or in negotiation by making a disclosure that 
facilitates a satisfactory conclusion. 
[8] Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to 
each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has 
instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers. 
Id. R.1.6 cmts. 7-8. 
15. Id. R. l.6(b)(l) (emphasis added). The Ethics 2000 Commission has 
recommended that both the "criminal act" and "imminent" limitations be removed and, 
as noted, the ABA House of Delegates agreed. See Glater, supra note 1, at Al2; see also 
infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. Model Rule 1.6 also allows disclosure to the 
extent necessary when the lawyer reasonably believes required: 
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life-threatening criminal activity exception, it will be helpful to first 
review briefly the relevant ABA Code provision and compare it to its 
Model Rule counterpart, and then consider the relationship of the duty of 
confidentiality to the attorney-client privilege. 
Although over forty states have adopted some form of the ABA' s 
Model Rules, a number of states still look to a variant of the ABA Code 
to regulate the legal profession. The primary section related to 
confidentiality in the ABA Code is Disciplinary Rule (DR) 4-101.16 
Similar to Model Rule 1.6, DR 4-lOl(B) prohibits lawyers from 
revealing confidential client information.17 Paragraph (C) of DR 4-101 
provides exceptions to the prohibitions of paragraph (B), including an 
exception permitting a lawyer to reveal his client's intention to commit a 
crime. 18 While the ABA Code still provides the basis for discipline in 
civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was 
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the 
lawyer's representation of the client. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b )(2). This exception is sometimes referred to 
as the lawyer's "self-defense exception." 
16. The Model Code is divided into Canons, each of which expresses "in general 
terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships 
with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession." MODEL CODE OF 
PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY, preliminary statement (1981). For example, Canon 4 of the 
Model Code states, "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a 
Client." Id. Canon 4. Each Canon in turn is subdivided into a number of "Ethical 
Considerations" and "Disciplinary Rules." The Ethical Considerations (EC) are 
"aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the 
profession should strive." Id. preliminary statement. The words "may" and "should," 
implying that the statement is precatory rather than mandatory, pervades most ECs. 
Disciplinary Rules (DR), on the other hand, are mandatory in character. They "state the 
minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to 
disciplinary action." Id. 
17. DR 4-lOl(B) provides: 
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-IOI(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client. 
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client. 
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of 
a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure. 
Id. DR 4-lOl(B) (footnotes omitted). 
18. DR 4-IOI(C) provides: 
(C) A lawyer may reveal: 
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients 
affected, but only after a full disclosure to them. 
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or 
required by law or court order. 
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information 
necessary to prevent the crime. 
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seven states, the trend among states is to adopt the Model Rules. 
Therefore, given the stated purpose of the ABA's Ethics 2000 
Commission-to evaluate and identify rules among the current Model 
Rules that may require revision19 -the focus of the ensuing discussion 
will be on the Model Rules. 
The duty to protect "information relating to representation of a client" 
in Model Rule 1.6 is somewhat broader than the duty of confidentiality 
under the ABA Code's DR 4-101, which concerns only a client's 
"confidences" and "secrets." DR 4-101 defines "confidence" as 
"information protected by the attorney-client privilege."20 It defines 
"secret" as "other information gained in the professional relationship that 
the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which 
would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the 
client,"21 which by its terms is not limited to information learned from 
the client. 
Unlike the ABA Code, the Model Rules adopted a single standard for 
information the lawyer must protect. The terminology used, "information 
relating to representation of a client," includes any other information the 
lawyer learns that is related to the representation of the client, whether 
subject to the attorney-client privilege or not.22 The client does not have 
to indicate whether the information is to be kept confidential, nor does 
the lawyer have to speculate whether the information will embarrass or 
be harmful to the client. 23 The lawyer's duty is not dependent on 
whether the lawyer acquired the information before or after the attorney-
client relationship existed.24 Nor is the duty dependent on whether the 
lawyer received it from the client or from another source.25 In short, if 
the information is about the client's matter, then the lawyer may not 
reveal it unless one of the exceptions applies. 
One further point to emphasize about "information relating to 
representation of a client" is that it necessarily contains within its ambit 
( 4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to 
defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation 
of wrongful conduct. 
Id. DR 4-lOl(C) (footnotes omitted). 
19. Ctr. for Prof'! Responsibility, American Bar Ass'n, ABA Ethics 2000 
Comm'n Final Report-Summary of Recommendations (June 9, 2001), at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-mlove_article.htm1. 
20. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (A). 
21. Id. 
22. See infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
23. MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 model code comparison (2001). 
Where relevant, the Model Rules contain a comparison between the rule and its 
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any attorney-client privileged matter. Although the concept of confidentiality 
in Model Rule 1.6 encompasses both attorney-client privileged 
communications and other confidential client information,26 it is important 
to distinguish the parameters of the duty of confidentiality and the 
attorney-client privilege. 
1. A Digression: The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Duty of 
Confidentiality Compared 
The privilege is a narrow evidentiary privilege that allows a client to 
prevent a witness from revealing confidential communications between 
client and lawyer (or either's agents).27 It is a privilege against compelled 
testimony. Put another way, its protection is triggered whenever a 
person, proceeding under the authority of the subpoena power of the 
state, attempts to compel a lawyer or party to the proceeding to disclose 
confidential client information.28 The privilege applies only to 
26. See id. R.1.6 cmt 5. 
27. The attorney-client privilege is governed by statute in many states. See, e.g., 
CAL. EVID. CODE§ 952 (West 1995). Nevertheless, the statutes appear to be, for the 
most part, codifications of the common law rule. See, e.g., Spectrum Sys. Int'l Corp. v. 
Chem. Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1059-60 (N.Y. 1991) (describing the attorney-client 
privilege statute as "a 'mere re-enactment of the common-law rule"' (quoting Hurlburt 
v. Hurlburt, 28 N.E. 651, 652 (N.Y. 1891))); see also J.F. Rydstrom, Annotation, 
Applicability of Attorney-Client Privilege to Communications with Respect to 
Contemplated Tortious Acts, 2 A.L.R. 3d 861 (1965). For example, in California, no 
new privilege can be created except by statute. CAL. EVID. CODE§ 911 (West 1995). 
On the other hand, no federal statute or rule sets out a federal attorney-client privilege. 
Instead, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide a more general framework for deciding 
evidentiary questions based on a claim of privilege: 
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or 
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court 
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege·of a witness, person, government, 
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the 
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in 
the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, 
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies 
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or 
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law. 
FED. R. EVID. 501; see also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) 
(discussing the attorney-client privilege following the death of the client); Upjohn Co. v. 
United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (discussing the extension of the attorney-client 
privilege to the employees of a corporate client). 
28. See infra notes 250-58 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory 
framework of California's attorney-client privilege). To invoke the privilege, it is not 
necessary to actually be present in a proceeding in a court or other government tribunal, 
nor is it necessary that a state official be attempting to compel the disclosure of 
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information the client herself ( or one of her agents) has communicated to 
her counsel in the course of seeking legal advice (and it also applies to 
the advice the client's counsel gives to the client).29 
The policy underlying the privilege is to encourage candor between 
the client and lawyer.30 A lawyer cannot adequately represent his client 
unless he knows the client's side of the story.31 Without the assurance of 
the attorney-client privilege, it is believed the client would not reveal the 
information necessary to enable effective representation. By assuring 
the client of the lawyer's confidentiality, the privilege encourages the 
client to frankly disclose information to assist the lawyer in the 
representation. This, in turn, "promote[s] broader public interests in the 
observance of law and the administration of justice."32 Nevertheless, 
because it is a narrow evidentiary privilege, it will usually fall unless 
each of the elements giving rise to it is satisfied.33 
information. For instance, depositions and other discovery requests propounded by 
nongovernment, private lawyers also implicate the privilege because lawyers conduct 
discovery under the general authority of the courts and, thus, state authority. A lawyer 
compels compliance with a discovery request by invoking the state's authority and filing 
a motion in court to compel the other party's compliance with Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26. See People v. Superior Court (Laff), 23 P.3d 563, 570-71 (Cal. 2001) 
(holding that the attorney-client privilege may be invoked in response to a search warrant 
issued as part of a criminal investigation). 
29. See, e.g., CAL. Evrn. CODE § 952 (West 1995) (defining "confidential 
communication between client and lawyer,"); id. § 954, (providing inter alia that the 
client only "has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, 
a confidential communication between client and lawyer' (emphases added)). The 
statutory framework of the attorney-client privilege in California is discussed in more 
detail infra notes 250-58 and accompanying text. 
30. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 403 (citing Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389). 
31. See, e.g., id.; Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1996); see also MODEL 
RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT pmbl. 'l[ 7, R. 1.6 cmts. 2, 4 (2001). 
32. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 403 (quoting Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389); see 
also Mitchell v. Superior Court, 691 P.2d 642,646 (Cal. 1984). 
[T]he fundamental purpose behind the privilege is to safeguard the confidential 
relationship between clients and their attorneys so as to promote full and open 
discussion of the facts and tactics surrounding individual legal matters. In 
other words, the public policy fostered by the privilege seeks to insure "the 
right of every person to freely and fully confer and confide in one having 
knowledge of the law, and skilled in its practice, in order that the former may 
have adequate advice and a proper defense." 
Mitchell, 691 P.2d at 646 (citations omitted). 
33. Wigmore set out the classic statement of the rule governing the application of 
the privilege: 
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal 
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that 
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance 
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, 
(8) except the protection be waived. 
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§ 2292, at 554 (John T. 
McNaughton revisor 1961) (footnote omitted). Section 68 of the Restatement (Third) of 
the Law Gove ming Lawyers reduces the number of elements, stating the rule as follows: 
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The duty of confidentiality, on the other hand, while having the same 
policy underpinnings as the attorney-client privilege, is broader than the 
privilege. It applies in every other situation that the privilege does not; it 
is, in essence, the lawyer's duty "not to gossip."34 The duty prohibits a 
lawyer, of his or her own volition, from divulging client information that 
is confidential or embarrassing, even if the lawyer learned the 
information from a source other than the client. The duty encompasses 
both attorney-client privileged communications and any other infonnation 
relating to representation of the client that may be embarrassing or 
detrimental to the client.35 The duty need not be triggered by another 
party seeking to coerce disclosure; it is simply one of the lawyer's 
paramount duties she must observe at all times.36 
This distinction between the scope of the duty and privilege is 
important to understanding why there remains confusion about whether 
California has a bodily harm exception to the duty of confidentiality. 
The current confusion over this will be discussed in Part ID of this 
Article.37 
Except as otherwise provided in this Restatement, the attorney-client privilege 
may be invoked as provided in § 86 with respect to: 
(1) a communication 
(2) made between privileged persons 
(3) in confidence 
(4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client. 
REsTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (1998). California's 
attorney-client privilege is contained in several sections of the Evidence Code. See CAL. 
Evro. CODE §§ 952-954 (West 1995); see also infra notes 250-58 and accompanying 
text. 
34. Referring to the duty as a "duty not to gossip" is not intended to denigrate the 
lawyer's duty to preserve client confidential information, but rather is intended to 
impress upon the reader the broad reach of the duty. It is critical to maintaining an 
effective lawyer-client relationship for the same reasons that the attorney-client privilege 
is viewed as critical within the legal system. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying 
text. Indeed, some authorities argue that the proscription on discussing confidential 
client information applies even when the information has subsequently become public. 
See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.7.4, at 301 (1986); see 
also State Bar of Cal. Comm. on Prof I Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1986-
87 (1987) (stating that a lawyer may not reveal a client's criminal record to the court, 
even though the criminal record is public). 
35. See, e.g., L.A. County Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 436 (1985). 
36. For example, a lawyer could not disclose to a friend in friendly conversation 
confidential information about a client's business that the client disclosed to the lawyer. 
Nor could the lawyer be compelled to disclose the substance of the communication to a 
party in a lawsuit against the client who is seeking that information. 
37. See infra Part III. 
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B. Current Model Rule J.6's Life-Threatening 
Criminal Activity Exception 
Current Model Rule 1.6 has two requirements that must be satisfied 
before a lawyer may (not must) disclose information to prevent a client 
from doing harm to a third person. First, the potential harm to third 
persons must be the result of the client's prospective criminal conduct. 38 
It is not enough that noncriminal acts of the client may cause potential 
harm. This limitation prevents a lawyer from revealing activities in 
which the client engages that are lawful but nevertheless may threaten 
life.39 
Second, the potential harm must be imminent. The rule is narrowly 
drawn to ensure that the lawyer can disclose client information only 
when he or she stands as the last barrier to the prospective harm.40 There 
are other limitations on the lawyer's discretion to disclose client 
information in this situation; for example, the lawyer must believe that 
the harm is "likely" to occur, and the lawyer may reveal information 
only "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary" to prevent 
the harm.41 
It is the "criminal act" and "imminent" limitations, however, that are 
of primary concern. The drafters of the Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Goveming Lawyers removed these limitations from their life-threatening 
harm exception,42 and the ABA House of Delegates recently adopted the 
ABA Ethics 2000 Commission's recommendation that they be 
removed.43 
C. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Gove ming Lawyers 
In an event long awaited, the final draft of the Restatement (Third) of 
the Law Governing Lawyers44 was published in late 2000 by the 
American Law Institute (ALI). The drafters worked on the final project, 
which was conceived in 1985, for about thirteen years.45 The ALI's 
Restatements are works that collect decisional and statutory law in a 
particular subject area (for example, torts or contracts) from the 
fifty-plus jurisdictions in the United States and organize the law "into a 
38. MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 1.6 (b)(l), R. 1.6 cmt 13 (2001). 
39. See infra Part IV.C. 
40. See infra Part IV.B. 
41. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b ), R. 1.6 cmt. 14. 
42. See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. 
43. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNORS LAWYERS (1998). 
45. Id. at XXII. 
/ 
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coherent and more readily digestible treatise."46 Generally, Restatements 
are objective, simply reporting what the law is generally recognized to 
be. The Restatements record positional splits among the jurisdictions, 
and usually take sides only when the dispute is evenly divided.47 In 
addition, where the ALI discerns trends, the Restatements may identify 
them and give them prominence in their black letter law.48 To a certain 
extent, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers followed 
a similar path; in other areas, however, it broke new ground. 
Unlike the states' ethics codes, which are largely adopted for use by 
tribunals charged with applying discipline to lawyers, the Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers attempts to cut a broader swath. 
Although it includes rules concerned with lawyer discipline that parallel 
those in the codes, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers also contains a chapter on civil liability for malpractice and an 
entire chapter devoted to the formation of the attorney-client 
relationship.49 In relation to confidentiality, the Restatement (Third) of 
the Law Governing Lawyers has included terms and provisions not 
otherwise found in a majority of jurisdictions. As noted, it is not 
46. Richard C. Stanley, The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyer 
Regulation Coming of Age, 48 LA. B.J. 22, 22 (2000). 
47. Id. 
48. See, e.g., J. Denny Shupe and Todd R. Steggerda, Toward a More Uniform and 
"Reasonable" Approach to Products liability litigation: Current Trends in the Adoption of 
the Restatement (Third) and Its Potential Impact on Aviation Litigation, 66 J. AIR L. & 
COM. 129, 132 (2000) ("The drafters of the Third Restatement [of Torts: Products 
Liability] have attempted not merely to restate existing doctrine but to move it in what 
they consider to be the right direction." (quoting Stanton v. Carlson Sales, Inc., 728 A.2d 
534, 549 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998))); see also Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public 
Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 828-
49 (2001) (recounting the "rebellion" at the 1970 meeting of the American Law Institute, 
in which members of the Institute were able to incorporate into the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts section 821C's public nuisance "special injury rule" federal court concepts of 
standing, notwithstanding the fact that hardly any state had taken that position in its 
decisional law). Indeed, as Antolini notes, in the years since the adoption of the 
Restatement's proposed change to the special injury rule, only one state, Hawaii, has 
ever adopted the proposed change, and most courts have simply ignored it. Antolini, 
supra, at 856. 
49. For the most part, the ethics codes all presume the formation of an attorney-
client relationship. But see, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 951 (West 1995) (defining "client" 
as one who "consults a lawyer for the purpose of retaining the lawyer or securing legal 
service or advice from him in his professional capacity," but not actually requiring the 
person consulting the lawyer to retain him in an attorney-client relationship). See also 
Ethics 2000, supra note 12 (discussing proposed Rule 1.18 entitled "Duties to 
Prospective Client"). 
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unusual for a Restatement in a particular area of law to detect a trend and 
weigh in on one side or the other.50 Some commentators, however, 
believe that the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers may have gone farther than those of other Restatements in 
choosing which variation of the law to propose as the black letter 
law.51 For example, despite the usual approach of the Restatements to 
synthesize and restate the law in a particular subject area objectively, the 
drafters of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers have 
proposed substantial changes to the duty of confidentiality as presently 
set forth in the Model Rules or the ABA Code, modifying some existing 
exceptions and adding some controversial new ones. 
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers' chapter on 
confidentiality, although consisting of several sections, is set up in a 
manner similar to both the Model Rules and the ABA Code-it defines 
the subject matter, sets forth the general rule, and then provides for 
exceptions to that §eneral rule. The first section defines "confidential 
client information." 2 The next section (section 60) states the basic duty, 
restricting a lawyer's right to use or disclose such information, subject to 
certain exceptions.53 The exceptions are set out in sections 61 through 
67 and include exceptions found in the Model Rules,54 as well as a 
controversial section 67 which would permit using or disclosing confidential 
information to prevent, rectify, or mitigate substantial financial loss 
resulting from the criminal acts of a client.55 The exception with which 
50. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
51. Stanley, supra note 46, at 23. 
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 (1998) 
("Confidential client information consists of information relating to representation of a 
client, other than information that is generally known."). 
53. Id. § 60(l)(a). 
Except as provided in §§ 61-67, ... the lawyer may not use or disclose 
confidential client information as defined in § 59 if there is a reasonable 
prospect that doing so will adversely affect a material interest of the client or if 
the client has instructed the lawyer not to use or disclose such information .... 
Id. Subsection ( 1 )(b) of section 60 requires the lawyer to take reasonable steps to protect 
the information from disclosure or adverse use by the lawyer's associates, and subsection 
(2) requires a lawyer to account to the client for pecuniary gain from using the client's 
confidential information. Id. § 60(1)-(2). 
54. For example, section 62 allows disclosure with the client's consent, section 63 
permits disclosures required by law, sections 64 and 65 allow disclosure, respectively, to 
enable the lawyer to defend against accusations brought by any person that the lawyer 
acted improperly or illegally in representing the client, and to resolve a compensation 
dispute with the client. Id. §§ 62-65. Section 66, discussed infra notes 57-62 and 
accompanying text, allows disclosure to prevent death or serious bodily harm. Id. § 66. 
55. Id. § 67. Some states already include similar provisions. See, e.g., ALA. 
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (1999); CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 
1.6(c)(l) (2001); HAW. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b) (2000); Mo. RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001); MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) 
(2001). The majority of states permit disclosure to prevent such a crime; however, only 
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this Article is primarily concerned is contained in section 66, which 
permits a lawyer to use or disclose confidential client information to 
prevent death or serious bodily harm. 
Section 66 provides in pertinent part: "A lawyer may use or disclose 
confidential client information when the lawyer reasonably believes that 
its use or disclosure is necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or 
serious bodily harm to a person."56 The drafters thus made two major 
changes to the life-threatening harm exception set out in the current 
Model Rules. First, the harm need no longer result from the criminal act 
or acts of the client; life-threatening harm, even if it results from an 
undertaking by the client that is perfectly legal, can trigger the 
exception. Second, the harm no longer must be imminent; the lawyer 
may reveal confidential client information even if the serious harm will 
not manifest itself for many years.57 
That the drafters would discard both of these limitations is somewhat 
surprising given that, to date, only three states have removed both the 
crime and temporal limitations from their statutory adoptions of the 
current Model Rules.58 In addition, one state has removed the criminal 
a minority permits disclosure to rectify a prior crime. See Attorneys' Liability Assurance 
Society, Inc., supra note 9, at 136-46. The drafters, perhaps recognizing this section is 
controversial, have provided for a "safe harbor" from civil liability in the event the 
lawyer exercises discretion and decides not to take any action under these circumstances. 
See REsTATEMENT(THIRD) OFTHELAWGoVERNINGLAWYERS § 67(4). 
Id. 
A lawyer who takes action or decides not to take action permitted under this 
Section is not, solely by reason of such action or inaction, subject to 
professional discipline, liable for damages to the lawyer's client or any third 
person, or barred from recovery against a client or third person. 
56. REsTATEMENT(THIRD) OFTHELAWGOVERNINGLAWYERS § 66(1). 
57. Although the drafters removed these limitations from the life-threatening 
injury exception, they retained the permissive nature of the rule as adopted in most 
jurisdictions. Lawyers are not required to disclose information to prevent serious bodily 
harm, but rather are given the option of doing so without being subject to discipline. 
Along these same lines, as with the fraud exception set out in section 67, the drafters 
have added a safe harbor provision with the intent to protect lawyers from liability or 
discipline for acting ( or not acting) as permitted under the rule. See id.§ 66(3). 
Id. 
A lawyer who takes action or decides not to take action permitted under this 
Section is not, solely by reason of such action or inaction, subject to 
professional discipline, liable for damages to the lawyer's client or any third 
person, or barred from recovery against a client or third person. 
58. See FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6(b)(2) (1994); GA. RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l)(ii) (1989); ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) 
(1993). Tennessee currently has a proposed Rule 1.6 under consideration which also 
would remove both limitations (establishing that "A lawyer may reveal information 
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act limitation while retaining the imminence standard.59 The remaining 
states and the District of Columbia retain a threshold requirement that the 
client has committed or intends to commit a criminal act before a lawyer 
can make any disclosure. Of these, only eleven jurisdictions still adhere to a 
requirement that the death or bodily injury be imminent.60 Thirteen 
jurisdictions that specifically identify life-threatening harm as a~propriate to 
trigger disclosure have discarded the imminence standard. Finally, 
another nineteen jurisdictions do not expressly mention death or bodily 
injury, but do allow or require disclosures of a client's intent to commit any 
crime.62 None of these latter states include a requirement of imminence. 
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes 
disclosure is necessary: (1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm"). TENN. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (Proposed Draft 2001), available 
at http://www.tba.org/committees/Conduct/index.html. 
59. See N.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l .6(a) (2000) (providing that 
disclosure or use of confidential information is "[r]equired to the extent the lawyer 
believes necessary to prevent the client from committing an act that the lawyer 
believes is likely to result in imminent death or imminent substantial bodily harm." 
(emphasis added)). 
60. ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l) (1999); DEL. RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001); KY. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001); LA. 
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2000); Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-
l.6(b)(l) (2001); MONT. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2000); NEV. RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 156(2) (2001); N.M. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 16-106(B) 
(2001); R.I. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001); S.D. RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l) (1995); VT. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (1995). 
61. ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (1999); ARIZ. RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b) (1997); CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2001); 
D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(c)(l) (1999); HAW. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 
R. l.6(c)(l) (2000); Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001); MASS. RULES 
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l) (2001); N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) 
(2001); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001); PA. RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(l) (2001); TEX. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. l.05(e) (2001); UTAH 
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001); WIS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 
20: l.6(b) (2001 ). Rule 3.6(H)( 4) in Maine, while not specifically referring to "death" or 
"bodily injury," provides: "This provision is not violated by the disclosure of a client's 
intention to commit a crime or the information necessary to prevent the crime or to avoid 
subjecting others to risk of harm." ME. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 3.6(H)(4) (2000). 
62. For example, Arkansas provides: "A lawyer may reveal such information to 
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: . . . to prevent the client from 
committing a criminal act." ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l) (2001); see 
also COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b) (2001); IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2002); KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001); 
MICH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(c)(4) (1988); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(3) (1993); MISS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001); 
N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(d)(4) (2001); OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 
R. l.6(b )( 1) (2001 ); S.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b )( 1) (2000); VA. RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(c)(l) (2001); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) 
(2001 ); W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b )(1) (2001 ); WYO. RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001). In addition, six states that have retained the provisions of 
the Model Code in some form permit disclosure of a crime without specifically 
mentioning life-threatening harm. See IOWA CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-
324 
[VOL. 39: 307, 2002] California's Duty of Confidentiality 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
D. The ABA 's Ethics 2000 Commission 
It appears at first glance that the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of 
the Law Governing Lawyers, at least with respect to confidentiality, have 
gone beyond an objective statement of what the law currently is. 
However, the ABA' s Ethics 2000 Commission also voted to include in 
its final report to the ABA House of Delegates a provision virtually 
identical to section 66(1) of the Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers.63 Proposed Model Rule l.6(b)(l) would provide: 
"A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to 
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm." The 
Reporter for the Ethics 2000 Commission explained these changes: 
The Commission recommends that the exception currently recognized for client 
crimes threatening imminent death or substantial bodily harm be replaced with a 
broader exception for disclosures to prevent reasonably certain death or 
substantial bodily harm, with no requirement of client criminality. This change 
is in accord with Section 66 of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the 
Law Governing Lawyers. The Rule replaces "imminent" with "reasonably 
certain," to include a present and substantial threat that a person will suffer such 
injury at a later date, as in some instances involving toxic torts.64 
At the time of this writing, there has been substantial opposition to the 
Ethics 2000 Commission's proposed changes to the confidentiality 
rule. 65 While most of the opposition has been directed at the criminal 
10l(C)(3) (2001); NEB. CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-10l(C)(3) (2001); N.Y. 
CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-10l(C)(3) (2002); OHIO CODE OF PROF'L 
REsPONSIBILITY 4-10l(C)(3) (2001); OR. CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-
10l(C)(3) (2002); TENN. CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-10l(C)(3) (2002). As 
noted previously, see supra note 58, Tennessee is considering the adoption of a modified 
Rule 1.6, which would remove both the criminal act and temporal limitations to 
disclosure. 
63. The ABA formed the Ethics 2000 Commission, formally known as the 
Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, in 1997 to review the 
current Model Rules and propose revisions. The genesis of the Commission was the 
concern of the then-President of the ABA, Jerome J. Shestack, his immediate 
predecessor, N. Lee Cooper, and his successor, Philip S. Anderson, that the current 
Model Rules, as adopted by the states, had created a "patchwork pattern" of state 
regulation, and some rules had "substantive shortcomings," while others had "lack of 
clarity." See Ctr. for Profl Responsibility, supra note 19. 
64. See Ctr. for Profl Responsibility, American Bar Ass'n, Model Rule 1.6: 
Reporter's Explanation of Changes 'JI 2 (May 2001), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-
rule16rem.html (emphasis added). 
65. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Lawyers Consider Easing Restriction on Client 
Secrecy, N.Y. TIMEs, July 31, 2001, at Al; Henry Weinstein, ABA Considers Ethics of 
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fraud exceptions that parallel section 67 of the Restatement (Third) of 
the Law Governing Lawyers and were contained in the Ethics 2000 
Commission's proposed Rule 1.6, paragraphs (b)(2) and (3),66 there has 
also been some opposition to the proposed revisions in the life-
threatening harm exception to the duty.67 This Article will address these 
issues below in discussing the scope that a life-threatening harm 
exception in California should take.68 Before proceeding to that analysis, 
however, it is necessary to first consider the duty of confidentiality and 
its parameters in California, its relationship to the attorney-client 
privilege, and why California should have an express exception that 
would allow a lawyer to prevent a client's life-threatening criminal 
activity. 
III. CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGE IN CALIFORNIA: DOES THE LIFE-
THREATENING CRIMINAL ACTIVITY EXCEPTION IN EVIDENCE CODE 
SECTION 956.5 ALSO APPLY TO BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE 
SECTION 6800(E)? 
As noted in the preceding section, California remains the only state 
without an express exception to its duty of confidentiality for life-
threatening criminal activity. California's lack of such an exception, 
however, should not be attributed to indifference on the part of either the 
State Bar of California or its membership. As will be discussed in some 
Client Secrecy, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2001, at A19. 
66. See, e.g., AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT OF THE LEGAL 
ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS ON DUTIES OF 
CONADENTIALITY 7-24 (2001). Along the same lines as section 67 of the Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission Proposed 
Rule l.6(c)(2) and (3) would provide: 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client 
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: ... 
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is 
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or 
property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using 
the lawyer's services; 
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has 
resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of 
which the client has used the lawyer's services .... 
Ctr. For Prof! Responsibility, American Bar Ass'n, Proposed Rule 1.6, at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rulel6.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2002). Proposed Rule 
l.6(b)(2) was defeated by a vote of255 to 151 at the ABA's annual meeting on August 
7, 2001, in Chicago. See Glater, supra note 1, at A12. After that vote, the proponents of 
the fraud exception rules withdrew Proposed Rule l.6(b)(3). Id. 
67. See, e.g., DAVID J. PASTERNAK, L.A. COUNTY BAR Ass'N, RULE l.6(b): 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION REPORT (2001 ). 
68. See infra Part IV. 
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detail below,69 the State Bar, on three separate occasions over the course 
of eleven years, proposed a rule of professional conduct that would have 
allowed a lawyer to disclose a client's confidential information to 
prevent death or serious bodily harm. Each time, the California 
Supreme Court rejected the proposal. While it is not certain why the 
court rejected three different versions of the proposed rule, some 
authorities have suggested there is no need for such a rule, either 
because the corresponding exceptions to the attorney-client privilege 
apply equally to the duty of confidentiality,70 or because the public 
policies underlying the exception mandate that such an exception be 
implied.71 Before analyzing these contentions, it is helpful first to 
describe the duty of confidentiality in California. 
A. California's Unique System for Regulation of the Legal Profession 
and Its Duty of Confidentiality 
California has a unique system for the regulation of lawyers. Whereas 
other states regulate their lawyers through their ethics codes, some 
version of either the Model Rules or the ABA Code, 72 California 
regulates the legal profession by both legislatively enacted statutes 73 and 
rules drafted by the state bar, published for public comment, and adopted 
by the supreme court.74 
Unlike other states where a lawyer's duty of confidentiality is set out 
in a professional discipline rule, in California, the duty is found in a 
statute, Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). Section 6068(e) 
provides that it is the duty of every California lawyer to "maintain 
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to 
preserve the secrets, of his or her client."75 Although not certain, it 
appears that California's sui generis regulatory system-lawyers' 
69. See infra Part V.B.1. 
70. The conclusion that the attorney-client privilege's express exceptions, CAL. 
EVID. CODE§§ 956-962 (West 1995), are applicable to the duty of confidentiality, CAL. 
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002), is derived from analysis of 
the legislative history of Cal Evidence Code section 956.5, the privilege's life-
threatening criminal activity exception, see infra Parts III.B.1-2, or from the California 
Supreme Court's allegedly implied holding that the privilege's exceptions also apply to 
the duty of confidentiality. See infra Part III.C. 
71. See infra Part III.D. 
72. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text 
73. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§§ 6000-6210 (West 1990 & Supp. 2002). 
74. See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2000). 
75. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 6068(e) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002). 
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conduct being subject to regulation by both legislatively enacted statutes 
and court-adopted rules-has played the starring role in California being 
the only state without a life-threatening criminal activity exception to its 
duty of confidentiality.76 
Although there appear to be some exceptions to the duty created by 
case law,77 and some commentators have considered whether exceptions 
to the statutory attorney-client privilege also apply to the duty of 
confidentiality contained in section 6068(e),78 California remains the only 
state without any express exceptions to its duty of confidentiality.79 It is 
possible, however, that despite this omission, there is no need for an 
express exception. Determining whether that contention is true requires 
a consideration of legislative history and a landmark California Supreme 
Court opinion. 
B. Can an Exception to the Duty of Confidentiality Be Implied from 
Evidence Code Section 956.5's Legislative History? 
Perhaps the most compelling argument that there is no need for any 
express exceptions to section 6068( e) resides in California's enactment 
in 1993 of Evidence Code section 956.5.80 Section 956.5 carves out an 
exception to the attorney-client privilege. It provides: 
76. See infra Part V.B.2; infra note 263 and accompanying text. 
77. See, e.g., Arden v. State Bar of Cal., 341 P.2d 6, 12 (Cal. 1959) (noting that a 
lawyer's use of confidential client information in a disciplinary proceeding to defend 
himself against allegations by client may be permissible); Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. 
v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 923 (Ct. App. 2001) (stating that a lawyer may 
disclose a client's confidential information to the lawyer's own attorney to determine 
whether those communications are admissible evidence in the lawyer's action against the 
client); Carlson, Collins, Gordon & Bold v. Banducci, 64 Cal. Rptr. 915, 923 (Ct. App. 
1967) (noting the "established principle" that use of confidential client information to 
protect an attorney's rights, in this case the right to fees, is permissible in litigation 
between the attorney and his client). See also infra Part III.C. 
In addition, at least two ethics opinions of the L.A. County Bar Association have 
concluded that disclosures are allowed to prevent a client from committing a criminal act 
that is likely to result in imminent death or serious bodily injury. L.A. County Bar Ass'n 
Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 436 (1985); L.A. County Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 264 
(1959); see infra Part III.D. 
78. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Privilege and Confidentiality in California, 28 
U.C. DAVIS. L. REv. 367, 378-96 (1995) (discussing whether section 956.5 of the 
California Evidence Code impliedly created an exception to Business and Professions 
Code section 6068(e)'s duty of confidentiality). Professor Zacharias concluded it did 
not. Id. at 396. His analysis is discussed more fully, infra Part III.B.2. 
79. See Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc., supra note 9, at 136-46 
(showing that every state except California has adopted either the Model Rules or the 
Model Code and thus every other state has express exceptions to the duty of 
confidentiality). 
80. 1993 Cal. Stat. 982, § 8 (codified at CAL. Evm. CODE§ 956.5 (West 1995)). 
328 
[VOL. 39: 307, 2002] California's Duty of Confidentiality 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
There is no privilege under this article if the lawyer reasonably believes that 
disclosure of any confidential communication relating to representation of a 
client is necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the 
lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm. 81 
Evidence Code section 956.5 thus appears to permit lawyers to disclose 
confidential client information to protect human life. 
As already noted, however, the attorney-client privilege is not 
coterminous with the duty of confidentiality,82 causing some California 
lawyers to question whether section 956.5 impliedly created an 
exception to the confidentiality duty in Business and Professions Code 
section 6068(e).83 A number of arguments qave been advanced in favor 
of both positions. 
1. Pro: The Legislative History of Evidence Code Section 956.5 
Demonstrates Legislative Intent to Create an Exception to 
Business and Professions Code Section 6068( e) 
First, pointing to Evidence Code section 956.5' s language, there are 
those who argue that section 956.5 demonstrates legislative intent to 
override Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) not only in the 
evidentiary context, but also in more general situations.84 Unlike other 
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, Evidence Code section 956.5 
is applicable only if the lawyer "reasonably believes" that disclosure is 
necessary. It provides a lawyer with a threshold standard for exercising 
81. CAL. EVID. CODE§ 956.5 (West 1995). 
82. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text. To restate briefly, the duty of 
confidentiality is broader than the attorney-client privilege. See Goldstein v. Lees, 120 
Cal. Rptr. 253, 257 n.5 (Ct. App. 1975). The attorney-client privilege is a narrow 
evidentiary privilege intended to protect client-lawyer confidential communications from 
compelled disclosure in the courtroom. The duty of confidentiality applies to lawyers 
both inside and outside the courtroom, and protects not only information communicated 
by the client, but also information the lawyer has learned from other sources in 
representing the client (including, for example, the lawyer's own investigation of the 
matter). 
83. See, e.g., Jeffrey P. Kerrane, Will Tarasoff Liability Be Extended to Attorneys 
in Light of New California Evidence Code Section 956.5?, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
825, 832-33 (1995); see also STATE BAR OF CAL. OFF1CE OF PROF'L COMPETENCE, 
PLANNING & DEV., REQUEST TIIAT THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA APPROVE 
PROPOSED RULE 3-100 OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF 
CALIFORNIA AND MEMORANDUM AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS IN EXPLANATION 3-4 
(1998) (recognizing the difference of opinion among members of the bar). But cf. 
Zacharias, supra note 78, at 378-97. 
84. Zacharias, supra note 78, at 378-97. 
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her discretion; the lawyer can disclose confidential client information 
only if she has a reasonable belief that such a disclosure is necessary to 
prevent the threatened consequences of the client's acts. None of the 
other exceptions to California's attorney-client privilege have similar 
language; they are all absolute.85 Moreover, "reasonably believes" is 
virtually identical to the language used by the ABA ethics codes in 
carving out a lawyer's discretionary exception to the duty of 
confidentiality.86 The use of this threshold-standard language thus might 
suggest a legislative intent to allow lawyers to prospectively prevent 
client conduct that will likely result in serious bodily harm by 
threatening disclosure of confidential information, in addition to 
allowing them to testify when compelled. 87 
Second, the legislative history of California's Senate Bill 645 contains 
express references to Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). 
These references, in two separate California Assembly Committee 
reports, suggest, some might argue, that the legislators who voted for the 
bill contemplated that the exception contained in Evidence Code section 
956.5 would override the strict confidentiality duty contained in 
Business and Professions Code section 6068(e).88 Each committee 
report states: "Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) requires 
attorneys to 'maintain inviolate the confidence, at every peril to himself 
or herself,' of his or her client. "89 In each report, this sentence is 
immediately followed with an explanation of Evidence Code section 
956.5's significance, noting for example, that disclosure of imminent 
client criminal conduct would be "permissive."90 The juxtaposition of 
85. Other exceptions or exclusions to the attorney-client privilege are not qualified 
by similar "reasonably believes" language. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 956 (West 
1995) ("There is no privilege under this article if the services of the lawyer were sought 
or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or a fraud."); id. 
§ 958 ("There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant to an issue 
of breach, by the lawyer or by the client, of a duty arising out of the lawyer-client 
relationship."). 
86. For example, Model Rule l.6(b)(I) provides, "A lawyer may reveal such 
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent the 
client from committing a criminal act." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(I) 
(2001) (emphasis added); see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS§ 67 (1998). 
87. But see infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text. 
88. See Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 25, 
1993); Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 18, 1993); 
Kerrane, supra note 83, at 832-33. 
89. Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 25, 1993); 
Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 18, 1993). 
90. Both of the cited committee reports follow the foregoing sentence with the 
following observations: 
The proposed statutory exception to the privilege raises the following issues: 
a) There is no requirement that the attorney reveal the imminent criminal 
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these observations to a reference to Business and Professions Code 
section 6068(e), even though neither report expressly states that 
Evidence Code section 956.5 will override Business and Professions Code 
section 6068(e), could therefore suggest that legislators believed they were 
modifying Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)'s duty of 
confidentiality and not just the more narrow attorney-client privilege.91 
conduct of a client. The provision is entirely permissive. 
b) The proposed provision does not state to whom the disclosure may, or shall, 
be made. There is no requirement that a clearly identified victim be warned. 
Nor is there any requirement that law enforcement be informed. 
c) Should the exception to the privilege be limited to instances of death or 
substantial bodily harm? Should confidentially obtained knowledge of massive 
financial fraud be subject to disclosure? Electoral fraud? Widespread illegal 
dumping of toxic waste? Drug smuggling? 
The proposal is well-motivated. Clearly ... , it may be forcefully argued that 
attorneys have some obligation to protect other members of society from 
violent criminal conduct. 
Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 25, 1993); Assembly 
Comm. Report on SB 645 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Aug. 18, 1993). 
91. Some have even argued that the legislative history of section 956.5 also 
demonstrates legislative intent not only to carve out an exception to the duty of 
confidentiality, but also to create an obligatory duty to disclose. See Michael A. 
Backstrom, Unveiling the Truth when It Matters Most: Implementing the Tarasoff Duty 
for California's Attorneys, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 139, 152-53 (1999); Kerrane, supra note 
83, at 832-33. As Mr. Backstrom explains, S.B. 645 was an attorney disciplinary bill 
addressing several issues of attorney regulation. S.B. 645, 1993-94 Reg. Sess., (Cal. 
1993-94). The bill, as originally introduced, provided for an alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism within the state bar to resolve client complaints against lawyers 
that do not warrant discipline, defined the composition and powers of the state bar's 
grievance panel, expanded the number of state bar hearing judges, and re-established a 
pilot project requiring lawyers to read and sign papers in civil cases testifying to their 
accuracy. Id. When proposed section 956.5 was subsequently added, it contained a safe 
harbor provision, exempting lawyers from civil liability in the event the lawyer declined 
to reveal client confidences. Id. (as amended May 12, 1993). Sharp criticism of this 
provision appeared in an Assembly Committee report dated August 18, 1993. The report 
noted that the safe harbor provision would treat lawyers differently from 
psychotherapists, who are not similarly protected: 
This immunity departs from the law that governs psychotherapists under 
similar circumstances. Evidence Code Section 1010 et. seq. creates a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege. However, Civil Code Section 43.92 does not 
immunize a psychotherapist who fails to warn (the potential victim and a law 
enforcement agency) of a serious threat of physical violence against a 
reasonably identifiable victim or victims. 
Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 18, 1993). The 
report then added, "It is not clear why attorneys should not be held to a similar standard 
of conduct." Id. Fifteen days after this report appeared, the provision was removed from 
the bill. S.B. 645, 1993-94 Reg. Sess., (Cal. 1993-94) (as amended Sept. 2, 1993). 
Mr. Backstrom has argued that "[s]uch a measure in the wake of criticism indicated a 
strong legislative intent to impose civil liability on attorneys who chose not to prevent 
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2. Con: The Legislative Intent of Evidence Code Section 956.5 
Is, at Best, Ambiguous 
Another commentator, Professor Fred Zacharias, however, has argued 
that the Legislature's intent in enacting Evidence Code section 956.5 is 
hardly unambiguous.92 Professor Zacharias relied on a leading 
California Supreme Court case on statutory interpretation, Hays v. 
Wood, which holds that a court can find a statute impliedly repealed or 
amended "only where the two acts are so inconsistent that there is no 
possibility of concurrent operation, or where the later provision gives 
undebatable evidence of an intent to supersede the earlier."93 
Professor Zacharias posited three arguments to satisfy the Hays 
prerequisites: (1) the legislative history for Evidence Code section 956.5 
expressed clear intent to amend a previous, related law; (2) previous 
legislative action demonstrates a clearly implied legislative intent; and 
(3) the statutes are so contradictory that an exception has to be implied.94 
a. The Legislative History Does Not Express a Clear Intent to Amend 
Business and Professions Code Section 6068( e) 
With respect to Senate Bill 645's legislative history, for which 
California courts require "undebatable evidence of an intent to supersede 
the earlier [statute],"95 Professor Zacharias noted that it is at best 
"murky," and discussed the contradictory language in both the 
committee reports and in the statute itself.96 While it is possible that the 
harm, thus creating an obligatory duty of disclosure." Backstrom, supra note 91, at 152. 
Although this argument is persuasive, it does not necessarily demonstrate an 
unmistakable intent by the legislature to override section 6068(e). Indeed, a subsequent 
Assembly Committee report, dated only eight days later, removed the language 
criticizing the safe harbor provision on which this argument so heavily relies. See 
Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 25, 1993). Further, 
the subsequent report expressly continues to caution readers that "[t]here is no 
requirement that the attorney reveal the imminent criminal conduct of a client. The 
provision is entirely permissive." Id. The August 25, I 993 report was the last to address 
whether disclosure would be mandatory or permissive. The express cautionary language 
in that report militates against an interpretation establishing a duty for lawyers, along the 
lines of psychotherapists, to disclose life-threatening criminal activity of their clients. 
See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (arguing that a life-threatening criminal 
activity exception to the duty of confidentiality should be permissive in nature). 
92. See Zacharias, supra note 78, at 380-97. 
93. 603 P.2d 19, 24 (Cal. 1979) (emphasis added). 
94. Zacharias, supra note 78, at 381. 
95. Hays, 603 P.2d at 24. 
96. Zacharias, supra note 78, at 353-85. In this regard, the Assembly report does 
make mention of section 6068(e) and refers to a Los Angeles case in which a law firm's 
client had threatened a judge but the firm felt constrained from disclosing the 
information by section 6068(e). Both of these references suggest that the legislature 
intended to modify section 6068(e). See Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645, 1993-94 
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legislature confused the privilege with the duty of confidentiality and 
may have thought it was addressing Business and Professions Code 
section 6068(e) in its enactment of Evidence Code section 956.5, this 
does not meet the "undebatable evidence,, standard of Hays. Indeed, as 
Professor Zacharias noted, there are signs that argue against such a 
conclusion. 
For example, Senate Bill 645 was a bill addressing several areas of 
lawyer discipline, of which Evidence Code section 956.5 was only a 
part. The legislature did amend other sections of the Business and 
Professions Code. If it intended to modify section 6068( e ), why did it 
not do so? Further, the language of Evidence Code section 956.5 itself 
argues against modification of Business and Professions Code section 
6068(e); the section begins, "There is no privilege under this article,,,97 
thus limiting its effect to the article of the Evidence Code containing the 
attorney-client privilege.98 The Evidence Code section thus appears to 
be targeted at the attorney-client privilege, not the duty of 
confidentiality. 
b. The Legislative Intent Cannot Be Inferred from the Confused History 
of Privilege and Confidentiality in California 
The second argument that would satisfy the Hays prerequisites is that 
notwithstanding the "privilege" language in Evidence Code section 
956.5, it is possible that California authorities have always equated the 
privilege with confidentiality. Thus, we might be able to infer 
legislative intent from the history of privilege and confidentiality in 
California, if not from the express language of Evidence Code section 
956.5 or its legislative history.99 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 25, 1993); Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645, 1993-94 Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. Aug. 18, 1993); see also supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. 
97. CAL. EVID. CODE§ 956.5 (West 1995). 
98. Zacharias, supra note 78, at 385. Moreover, the report's discussion mentions 
that the language of section 956.5 runs counter to People v. Clark, 789 P.2d 127, 152 
(Cal. 1990), which had stated that "[n]o express exception to the attorney-client privilege 
exists for threats of future criminal conduct." Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645, 1993-
94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 25, 1993) (emphasis added). In short, some legislators may 
have voted for Evidence Code section 956.5 simply to overrule Clark's interpretation of 
the attorney-client privilege and not to modify the duty of confidentiality to allow 
lawyers to prevent their clients from committing life-threatening crimes. Zacharias, 
supra note 78, at 385-86. 
99. Zacharias, supra note 78, at 386-92. Professor Zacharias considered several 
arguments that might support a finding of implied legislative intent, only some of 
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For example, as Professor Zacharias noted, California appears to be 
alone among the states in referring to "confidential information" in its 
version of the attorney-client privilege.100 In addition, although Evidence 
Code section 952 defines "confidential communication" as "information 
transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer ... [that] includes a 
legal opinion formed and the advice given by the lawyer," 101 section 
6068(e), unlike other states' ethics codes, does not itself contain a 
definition of "confidential information."102 This might suggest that the 
legislature intended that lawyers look to the Evidence Code's definition 
of confidential information to determine the scope of the lawyer's duty 
of confidentiality. 103 
Further, the California Supreme Court's rejection of a proposed Rule 
3-100 that would have provided an exception to the duty of 
confidentiality for life-threatening criminal activity also argues for 
implied intent. Aware of that rejection, based at least in part on the 
court's concern that it would have trespassed on the legislature's sole 
authority to amend the statutory privilege, 104 we might infer that the 
which are discussed here. 
I 00. Id. at 387-88. 
101. CAL. Evm. CODE§ 952 (West 1995). 
102. For example, Model Code, Rule 4-10 I (A) defines "confidence" and "secret" as 
follows: 
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege 
under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the 
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the 
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be 
detrimental to the client. 
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-10 I (A) (1981 ). Business and Professions 
Code section 6068(e) also refers to "confidence" (as opposed to "confidences") and 
"secrets," but does not define either term. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 
1990 & Supp. 2002). California ethics opinions have viewed "confidence" to mean that 
a lawyer "may not do anything to breach the trust reposed in him or her by the client," 
while preserving secrets means not revealing anything "gained in the professional 
relationships ... the disclosure [of] which would be embarrassing and would be likely to 
be detrimental to the client." See, e.g., State Bar of Cal. Comm. on Prof I Responsibility 
& Conduct, Formal Op. 1986-87 (1987). But cf L.A. County Bar Ass'n Comm. on 
Legal Ethics, Formal Op. 436 (1985), (adopting the Model Code definition of 
"confidence" and "secrets" contained in DR 4-IOI(A)). See infra notes 152-55 and 
accompanying text. 
103. That there may be confusion in the California law of confidentiality can be 
seen in a number of cases in which the courts themselves appear to have equated 
privilege with confidentiality. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 78, at 389-90, n.75; see 
also infra notes 115-50 and accompanying text. 
104. The supreme court's rejection of the proposed rule appears to have been tied to 
its concern that adopting such an exception to the duty of confidentiality would trespass 
on the legislature's prerogative to amend the attorney-client privilege that has been 
codified from the common law. In a June 1988 letter to the then-President of the State 
Bar of California regarding proposed Rule 3-lOO's exceptions to confidentiality, the 
California Supreme Court wrote: 
Regarding proposed Rule 3-1 OO(C)(3) (Duty to Maintain Client Confidence 
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legislature's 1993 amendment of the Evidence Code to create the life-
threatening criminal act exception to the attorney-client privilege was 
intended to treat privilege and confidentiality with a single stroke, thus 
appearing to address both the privilege and the supreme court's 
demonstrated reluctance to revise the duty of confidentiality. 105 
As Professor Zacharias points out, however, the supreme court's 
declining to adopt a confidentiality exception in the face of the Evidence 
Code would have emphasized to the legislature the confusion inherent in 
the area of privilege and confidentiality.106 Should not the legislature 
have been expected to address the issue head-on and expressly state its 
intent that section 6068(e) be read in concert with section 956.5? The 
legislature's failure to rectify or clarify the confusion thus argues against 
implying an exception to the duty of confidentiality.107 
c. The Irreconcilable Contradiction Between Evidence Code Section 
956.5 and Business and Professions Code Section 6068( e) Does Not 
Warrant Their Hannonization to Remove the Inconsistency 
If, as discussed, there is no clearly expressed or clearly implied 
legislative intent to place limits on Business and Professions Code 
section 6068(e)'s duty of confidentiality by the amendments to Evidence 
and Secrets Inviolate), in what context does it allow for disclosure of otherwise 
privileged attorney-client information? To the extent it permits disclosure in a 
judicial proceeding where no statutory exception to the privilege exists, it may 
be inconsistent with, or contravene the Legislature's intent underlying 
Evidence Code section 950 et seq. (Cf. Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 
Cal.3d 531, 539-540.) Where the Legislature has codified, and revised, or 
supplanted privileges previously available at common law, does the court have 
inherent authority to modify this statutory privilege? 
STAIB BAR OF CAL. OFFICE OF PROF'L COMPETENCE, PLANNING & DEV., supra note 83, at 
10-11 (quoting Letter from California Supreme Court, to Terry Anderlini, President, 
State Bar of California (June 9, 1998)). The court thus appears to have viewed any 
change to the duty of confidentiality as overreaching its authority. That, however, may 
be too broad a reading of the court's letter. See infra notes 247-72 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of Rule 3-lOO's history and its implications for implementing a life-
threatening criminal activity exception. 
105. Zacharias, supra note 78, at 390. 
106. Id. at 390-91. 
107. This is particularly true with respect to the California Evidence Code, which 
contains language in section 911 that expressly limits privileges to those created by 
statute. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 911 (West 1995). The California Supreme Court has 
interpreted section 911 to strictly prohibit judges from implying ''unwritten exceptions to 
existing statutory privilege." Roberts v. City of Palmdale, 853 P.2d 496, 501 (Cal. 
1993). For a full discussion of this argument, see Zacharias, supra note 78, at 391. 
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Code section 956.5, then there is a third possibility supporting a 
harmonization of the two statutes: the sections are so contradictory in 
their terms that courts would be justified to infer an exception to remove 
h . · 108 t e mconszstency. 
The initial question is whether the two sections are irreconcilable as 
they stand. Professor Zacharias suggests not. First, the 1993 
amendment to Evidence Code section 956.5 can "be viewed as providing 
litigants-the victim or a prosecutor-with access to probative evidence 
after the occurrence of third-party harm."109 Put another way, the 
litigant who seeks disclosure of the confidential information would be 
provided with evidence in the form of confidential information that the 
policies underlying the privilege would otherwise protect from 
compelled disclosure. The reason disclosure is allowed is because the 
client, having committed the crime, "is not entitled to secrecy at all." 110 
Implicit in this interpretation of Evidence Code section 956.5 is the view 
that the lawyers may warn clients of eventual disclosure to persuade the 
client not to commit a criminal act, but are foreclosed from disclosing 
the information unless the client actually commits the act. In other 
words, the lawyers may use the threat of disclosure to reason with the 
client, but may disclose the client's act only if the client goes through 
with it.'" In this way, clients who desist from going forward with their 
criminal intent are not punished; only those who actually commit the 
criminal act face disclosure of the proof. 112 
Thus, eliminating the privilege for life-threatening criminal activity, 
but preserving the protections of confidentiality makes sense in terms of 
policy. When there is no irreconcilable conflict between the two 
statutes, there is no further need to harmonize Business and Professions 
Code section 6068(e) with Evidence Code section 956.5 by importing 
the latter's exception into the former. 113 Under this view, however, 
108. See Zacharias, supra note 78, at 392-96. 
109. Id. at 394 (emphasis added). The idea here is that, while the lawyer could not 
voluntarily disclose confidential information before the event, she could be compelled by 
subpoena to produce it after the fact. Id. at 395-96 & n.99. 
110. Id. at 395. See also Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 
504 (Cal. 1994); infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text. 
111. See Zacharias, supra note 78, at 394-95. 
112. Id. at 395. 
113. Although this argument resolves the inconsistency between the two sections, it 
still is not completely satisfactory. For example, the language of section 956.5 provides 
that "[t]here is no privilege under this article if the lawyer reasonably believes that 
disclosure of any confidential communication ... is necessary to prevent the client from 
committing a criminal act." CAL. Evm. CODE§ 956.5 (West 1995). The "disclosure" is 
expressly the kind that the lawyer "reasonably believes" is "necessary" to "prevent" the 
client from committing a criminal act, not to "rectify" a criminal act. As for reasoning 
with the client, a lawyer cannot "disclose" confidential information to a client. 
According to the Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, disclose means "to expose to 
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California lawyers are left without guidance about how to proceed when 
they confront life-threatening criminal activity by their clients. 
C. The General Dynamics Case: Has the California Supreme Court 
Already Impliedly Held that the Attorney-Client Privilege's 
Exceptions Are to Be Read into the Duty of Confidentiality? 
Court opinions appear to demonstrate a confusion between the duty of 
confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege that is commensurate 
with that of the statutory landscape.114 The 1994 California Supreme 
Court decision in General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court115 is a case 
on point. There, the court appears to have used the concepts of privilege 
and confidentiality interchangeably. Nevertheless, a California appellate 
court recently concluded that General Dynamics stands for the 
proposition that the attorney-client privilege's express exceptions, 
including Evidence Code section 956.5, can be read into the duty of 
confidentiality prescribed in Business and Professions Code section 
6068(e). 116 To understand that appellate court's position, it is necessary 
to discuss General Dynamics in some depth. 
In General Dynamics, the supreme court held that under certain 
narrow circumstances, an in-house lawyer can bring a retaliatory 
discharge claim against her former corporate client, notwithstanding the 
ethical duties of confidentiality and loyalty the lawyer owes the client. 
Noting that wrongful discharge claims are rooted in public policy 
considerations, the court first laid out the stiff requirements that any 
employee-not just a lawyer-must satisfy before she will be allowed to 
pursue such a suit.117 
view," or "to make known or public." MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 113 
(9th ed. 1985). A lawyer need not disclose information to someone who is already privy 
to the information. Professor Zacharias' argument would be better served if section 
956.5 used the language "threatened disclosure" in addition to "disclosure." Given the 
California Supreme Court's view on reading too much into the language of privilege, see 
supra note 107, we should probably conclude that disclosure means just that, and not a 
threat of disclosure. Nevertheless, that does not mean that the legislature has created a 
statutory scheme that is hopelessly inconsistent and warrants implying an exception for 
Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). 
114. Zacharias, supra note 78, at 389 n.75. 
115. 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994). 
116. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 923 (Ct. App. 
2001). 
117. Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 497. First, the discharge must be in violation of a 
public policy "that is not only 'fundamental' but is clearly established in the Constitution 
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Assuming a lawyer has satisfied those general requirements, she 
still has other obstacles to hurdle. Put simply, while in-house counsel 
are employees and thus ostensibly can claim protection pursuant to 
the policies underlying the wrongful discharge tort, the court still had 
to address whether lawyers, because of their professional duties 
creating fiduciary obligations to their clients, are a breed apart from 
nonprofessional employees. 
After noting that in-house attorneys differ from outside counsel 
because of their dependence for livelihood on the goodwill and 
confidence of a single employer, the court concluded that such lawyers, 
because their professional duties are "affected with a public interest," 
have a stronger claim to judicial protection than their nonprofessional 
colleagues. 118 
Despite this general observation that a lawyer's duties are "affected 
with a public interest," the court still had to resolve whether a lawyer's 
duties relating to confidentiality mandate the denial of a wrongful 
discharge remedy to the lawyer. After all, confidentiality is at the 
heart of the attorney-client relationship, 119 and a lawyer's breach of 
confidentiality will undermine the fiduciary relationship. The court thus 
had to determine whether the policy underpinnings of the retaliatory 
discharge claim can warrant a breach of fiduciary duties. 120 
Rejecting the reasoning of other courts that had denied a retaliatory 
discharge recovery to lawyers as reflecting an "adherence to an 
and positive law of the state." Id. Second, the public policy that the employee's conduct 
vindicated "must be a truly public one, that is, 'affect[ing] a duty which inures to the 
benefit of the public at large rather than to a particular employer or employee."' Id. 
(quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 379 (Cal. I 988)). Finally, the 
court observed that there was a third limiting characteristic of retaliatory discharge suits: 
the employee is allowed a cause of action not in the interest of preserving the employee· s 
employment, but rather to vindicate the underlying public policy to protect the public: 
"decisions recognizing a tort action for discharge in violation of public policy seek to 
protect the public, by protecting the employee who refuses to commit a crime ... , who 
reports criminal activity to proper authorities, or who discloses other illegal, unethical, or 
unsafe practices." Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Foley, 765 P.2d at 373). In short, an 
employee is provided a tort remedy not so much to compensate the individual, but rather 
to vindicate indirectly the underlying public policy. The court stated: 
An employee who states a wrongful discharge claim for having refused to join 
a criminal conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws, or for having resisted 
efforts to induce him to give false information in a public investigation of 
sexual harassment charges filed by a coworker, is provided a remedy in tort not 
only to compensate the individual plaintiff for the loss of employment but as 
an indirect means of vindicating the underlying fundamental public policy 
itself 
Id. (citations omitted). 
118. Id. at 498. 
119. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
120. Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 497. 
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anachronistic model of the attorney's place and role in contemporary 
society,"121 the court concluded that in-house counsel should be provided 
a retaliatory discharge remedy. Notwithstanding their confidentiality 
duties, 122 in-house counsel should have a remedy "in those instances in 
which mandatory ethical norms embodied in the Rules of Professional 
Conduct collide with illegitimate demands of the employer and the 
attorney insists on adhering to his or her clear professional duty." 123 
Nevertheless, an in-house lawyer who seeks to sue her former corporate 
client employer for retaliatory discharge has additional obstacles not 
faced by her nonprofessional colleagues. 
First, a court must "ask whether the attorney was discharged for 
following a mandatory ethical obligation prescribed by professional 
rule or statute."124 For example, if the in-house counsel refuses an 
employer's request to commit a crime or engage in an act of moral 
turpitude that is disciplinable by disbarment and is therefore discharged, 
then the lawyer will have been discharged for complying with a 
mandatory ethical obligation and will thus have a claim for retaliatory 
discharge. 125 Such a mandatory ethical rule would allow the lawyer to 
engage in nonfiduciary conduct in the interests of the public. 
A lawyer, however, is not limited to a remedy only if she adheres to a 
mandatory ethical obligation. The lawyer will still have a claim even if 
the actions for which she was discharged involved an ethical obligation 
that is merely permissive so long as: 
some statute or ethical rule, such as the statutory exceptions to the attorney-
client privilege codified in the Evidence Code (see id., §§ 956-958) specifically 
permits the attorney to depart from the usual requirement of confidentiality with 
respect to the client-employer and engage in the "nonfiduciary" conduct for 
which he was terminated.126 
121. Id. at 500 & n.5. The court rejected the reasoning in three non-California 
decisions that focused on the lawyer's primary duty to the client. Id. at 498-501 (citing 
Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991)); Herbster v. N. Am. Co. for Life and 
Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 
116 (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
122. The court recognized the "the priest-like license to receive the most intimate 
and damning disclosures of the client, [and] the sanctity of the professional privilege." 
Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 501. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 502. 
125. Id. at 502-03. 
126. Id. at 503 (emphasis added). The court, however, stressed the limited nature of 
the lawyer's remedy, as "[t]he lawyer's high duty of fidelity to the interests of the client 
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The question thus comes down to when an in-house lawyer can engage 
in nonfiduciary conduct and still maintain an action against her client 
employer after being discharged for that conduct. The court resolved this 
question by first, noting that the mutual trust and confidence essential to 
the attorney-client relationship can be protected by limiting in-house 
counsel's resort to the courts to claims rooted in "explicit and unequivocal 
ethical nonns embodied in the Rules of Professional Responsibility and 
statutes," and maintainable by a nonlawyer employee. 127 Moreover, the 
court cautioned that such an action can be maintained only "under 
circumstances in which the Legislature has manifested a judgment that 
the principle of professional confidentiality does not apply," such as in 
Evidence Code section 956.5.128 In other words, if the in-house lawyer 
is under a duty to preserve the clients' confidences, she will not find a 
welcome ear in the courts. 
The court stressed that the "contours of the statutory attorney-client 
privilege should continue to be strictly observed."129 Importantly, the 
court noted that most situations in which the in-house lawyer confronts 
an ethical quandary will lie outside the privilege's scope: 
Matters involving the commission of a crime or a fraud, or circumstances in 
which the attorney reasonably believes that disclosure is necessary to prevent 
the commission of a criminal act likely to result in death or substantial bodily 
harm, are statutory and well-recognized exceptions to the attorney-client 
privilege. Although their revelation in the course of a retaliatory discharge suit 
may do lasting damage to the expectations of the corporate client (or, more 
likely, a corporate executive) that disclosures to counsel would remain inviolate, 
a concern for protecting the fiduciary aspects of the relationship in the case of a 
client who confides in counsel for the purpose of planning a crime or practicing 
a fraud is misplaced; such disclosures do not violate the privilege.130 
In essence, the court observed that a client who uses a lawyer to plan a 
crime or fraud or creates circumstances in which the lawyer reasonably 
believes disclosure is necessary to prevent the client's life-threatening 
criminal activity, should have no expectation that the lawyer will not 
subsequently disclose confidential client information. Under such 
circumstances, there simply is no privilege. By expressly referring to 
Evidence Code section 956.5' s privilege exception for life-threatening 
work against a tort remedy that is coextensive with that available to the non-attorney 
employee." Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. In quoting Evidence Code section 956.5, the court emphasized the 
language, "[t]here is no privilege." Id.; see infra notes 133-50 and accompanying text. 
129. Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 504 (emphasis added). Indeed, the court observed 
that "the in-house attorney who publicly exposes the client's secrets will usually find no 
sanctuary in the courts." Id. at 503. 
130. Id. at 504 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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criminal activity131 and discussing criminal and fraudulent acts which are 
the subject of the crime-fraud privilege exception contained in Evidence 
Code section 956, 132 the court appears to have impliedly concluded that 
the exceptions to the attorney-client privilege found in Evidence Code 
sections 956 through 962 apply equally to the duty of confidentiality set 
forth in Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). 133 
But is that really what the court intended? Or was it simply confusing 
the privilege that is excepted in Evidence Code section 956.5 with the 
duty that is set forth in Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)? 
The reason we might ask that question is because, as already noted, 134 
the attorney-client privilege generally protects against the compelled 
disclosure of confidential information. 135 It is a narrow evidentiary 
privilege that will generally fall in the face of fundamental public 
policies that mandate that the privileged material be disclosed to assist 
the trier of fact in its search for the truth.136 
When a lawyer sues her former client-employer for retaliatory 
discharge, however, the privilege's protection against compelled 
131. Id. at 503. 
132. California Evidence Code section 956 provides: "There is no privilege under 
this article if the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone 
to commit or plan to commit a crime or a fraud." CAL. EVID. CODE§ 956 (West 1995). 
133. As already noted, supra note 116 and acompanying text, the California Court 
of Appeal, Second District, in ruling that a former in-house lawyer could disclose 
confidential information of her former corporate client to the lawyers she retained to 
prosecute her wrongful discharge case, held precisely that. See Fox Searchlight Pictures, 
Inc. v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906 (Ct. App. 2001). The court stated that 
"[a]lthough the statute on its face brooks no exceptions, it must be read in conjunction 
with other statutes and ethical rules which specifically permit the attorney to depart from 
the usual rules of client confidentiality." Id. at 922. The court then reasoned that section 
958 of the California Evidence Code, which states that the privilege does not apply "to a 
communication relevant to an issue of breach, by the lawyer or the client, of a duty 
arising out of the lawyer-client relationship," might be relevant to the case before it, 
where the discharged lawyer was claiming the employer had discriminated against her on 
the basis of sex. Id. (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE§ 958). 
134. See supra Part II.A. I. 
135. See infra notes 255-58 and accompanying text. California Evidence Code 
section 901 provides that any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, applies 
in any proceeding where "testimony can be compelled to be given." CAL. Evm. CODE 
§ 901. Section 902 defines "civil proceeding" and section 903 defines "criminal 
proceeding". Id. §§ 902-903. Section 911 of the California Evidence Code provides, 
inter alia, that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, ... [n]o person has a privilege 
to refuse to be a witness." Id. § 911. Together, these sections demonstrate that the 
attorney-client privilege may be asserted in a civil or criminal proceeding to protect 
against being compelled to disclose information subject to a privilege. 
136. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text. 
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disclosure would not be the client's (or the court's) primary concern. 
Rather, an in-house lawyer would be seeking voluntarily to disclose the 
privileged information to support her case against the employer, 
presumably because it would be necessary evidence without which she 
could not prove her case. No party to the proceeding would be trying to 
compel the disclosure. On the contrary, in a retaliatory discharge suit, 
the employer's lawyers would be using every procedural device in their 
arsenal to prevent the former in-house lawyer from disclosing 
information subject to the privilege. 
The supreme court would have understood that, on the one hand, an 
employee would want to voluntarily disclose information, implicating 
the duty, while on the other hand, the employer would utilize its lawyers 
to prevent that information from being disclosed in open court, thus 
implicating the privilege. The court, after all, noted that "trial courts can 
and should apply an array of ad hoc measures from their equitable 
arsenal designed to permit the attorney plaintiff to attempt to make the 
necessary proof while protecting from disclosure client confidences 
subject to the privilege,"137 suggesting it well understood the tension 
between the employee's need for evidence to prove her suit and the 
employer's desire to maintain the confidentiality of its privileged 
information. 138 Moreover, the court stated that "where the elements of a 
wrongful discharge [claim] ... cannot ... be fully established without 
[the employee lawyer] breaching the attorney-client privilege, the suit 
must be dismissed in the interest of preserving the privilege." 139 
Although the court used the term "attorney-client privilege," its use of 
the word "breaching" in relation to it (rather than the phrase "failing to 
claim") 140 suggests it may have meant the duty of confidentiality. Its 
apparent transposition of privilege and confidentiality in the context of 
the case leaves the reader with the sense that it viewed the two terms as 
137. Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 504 (Cal. 1994). 
Presumably, the court interpreted "disclosure" to mean "public" disclosure. The court 
identified what kind of measures it contemplated would avoid disclosure of privileged 
information beyond the parties to the suit: 
Id. 
The use of sealing and protective orders, limited admissibility of evidence, 
orders restricting the use of testimony in successive proceedings, and, where 
appropriate, in camera proceedings, are but some of a number of measures that 
might usefully be explored by the trial courts as circumstances warrant. 
138. Moreover, the court expressly recognized that the duty of confidentiality 
contained in section 6068(e) was part of the California "principle of professional 
confidentiality" that came into play in wrongful discharge cases. Id. at 503 & n.6. 
139. Id. at 503-04 (emphasis added). 
140. Section 955 of the California Evidence Code provides that a lawyer "shall 
claim the privilege whenever he is present when the communication is sought to be 
disclosed." CAL. Evm. CODE § 955 (West 1995); see also infra notes 255-58 and 
accompanying text. 
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interchangeable. In doing so, it added to the confusion regarding 
confidentiality law in California. 
There is, however, another possibility: the court was fully aware of 
what it was saying and simply set forth a threshold standard for 
confidential client information that can be disclosed in such suits. The 
court appears to have been well aware that where there is an exception to 
the privilege, the employer will not be able to assert the privilege to 
prevent a lawyer from disclosing the information. Rather, its discussion 
of privilege may have been intended not to focus on the lawyer's duty to 
assert the privilege or the context in which the duty to assert the 
privilege may arise,141 but rather on the kind of information that is 
subject to the privilege's protection-client communications.142 The 
court in essence was stating that even this kind of information-which 
courts generally protect even in the face of undermining the "truth-
seeking" function of the court-can be disclosed by in-house counsel 
under the proper circumstances. 143 
What then of information the lawyer learns from other sources, that is, 
information that is not communicated to the lawyer by the client?144 The 
court repeatedly speaks of the "privilege" or "privileged information," 
but says little, if anything, about other sources of information protected 
under Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)'s broader duty of 
141. Section 955 of the California Evidence Code requires a lawyer to assert the 
privilege in any proceeding in which another party is seeking disclosure of a client 
communication (as that term is defined in section 952). CAL. EVID. CODE§ 955; see also 
infra notes 250--62 and accompanying text 
142. "Confidential communication between client and lawyer" is defined in section 
952 of the California Evidence Code. CAL. EVID. CODE § 952. 
143. After quoting Justice Cardozo's assertion that "'[t]he privilege takes flight if 
the relation is abused," the General Dynamics court noted that although disclosure of 
client information regarding criminal acts or fraud "may do lasting damage to the 
expectations of the corporate client . . . that disclosures to counsel would remain 
inviolate," such disclosures do not violate the attorney-client privilege. Gen. Dynamics, 
876 P.2d at 504 (quoting Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933)). That is because 
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, including the crime-fraud and life-threatening 
criminal act exceptions, all provide that "there is no privilege" if facts giving rise to the 
exception exist. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 956, 956.5; see also supra notes 129-30 and 
accompanying text. If there is no privilege to protect such information-information 
directly communicated from the client to the lawyer and therefore information generally 
subject to the privilege-then the lawyer should be able to decline to "claim" the 
privilege when the unprivileged communication "is sought [by another party] to be 
disclosed." CAL. Evm. CODE § 955. In short, the lawyer would disclose by "not 
claiming" the privilege. Moreover, the lawyer should also be able affirmatively to 
disclose the communication to support her wrongful discharge claim. 
144. See supra Part II.A.I. 
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confidentiality. 145 Is it possible that the court did not mean to limit the 
reach of its opinion to "privileged" information (including only 
information "communicated" between the lawyer and the client), but 
simply set a threshold for information that can be disclosed? Put another 
way, can we assume that if information subject to the attorney-client 
privilege, a privilege which the "judicial system has carefully 
safeguarded,"146 can be disclosed under appropriate circumstances, then 
other confidential client information, not directly communicated by the 
client, is also subject to disclosure when one of the statutory exceptions 
to the privilege is present?147 If we can so assume, then General 
Dynamics stands for the proposition that the exceptions to the attorney-
client privilege apply equally to any information covered by the duty of 
confidentiality. 148 
If that is the case, however, why did the court not simply say so? At 
the time it decided General Dynamics, it had already considered and 
rejected two proposals by the State Bar to add a new rule of professional 
conduct that would have created a life-threatening criminal activity 
exception to the duty of confidentiality. As is discussed in more detail 
below, in 1988, the court expressed its concern that, at least in the 
testimonial context, such an exception to the duty of confidentiality 
would probably infringe on the authority of the legislature to define the 
scope of evidentiary privileges. 149 The court was thus aware of the 
145. The only reference the court makes to Business and Professions Code section 
6068(e) is noting that an attorney who unsuccessfully pursues a retaliatory discharge suit 
reveals privileged client confidences, "may be subject to State Bar disciplinary 
proceedings." Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 504. 
146. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 691 P.2d 642, 646 (Cal. 1984). 
147. It is possible that the General Dynamics court was perfectly aware of what it 
was doing. By referring repeatedly in its opinion to "privileged information," the court 
was setting a standard for the kind of information the lawyer could use. The court 
wanted future litigants who otherwise met the requirements of a retaliatory discharge 
claim to understand that they could use so-called "privileged information"-information 
communicated by the client itself-in making out their claims, so long as one of the 
legislatively-sanctioned exceptions to the privilege was applicable. Other kinds of 
confidential information would also be fair game, so long as they were at least analogous 
to the privilege exceptions. Alternatively, the court may have focused on the privilege 
language simply because in a retaliatory discharge suit, the kind of confidential 
information to which the lawyer would be privy and which would be relevant to the 
claim would most likely have been learned through a client communication and thus 
would have been privileged. Other kinds of information related to the representation 
would be relatively immaterial to the suit, or even may have been something the court 
simply did not contemplate. If that is what the court intended, however, it should have 
expressly stated its intent. Instead, its wholesale swapping of terms only added to the 
confusion surrounding confidentiality in California. 
148. This is precisely the holding of a recent court of appeal decision. See Fox 
Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906,923 (Ct. App. 2001). 
149. See infra notes 259-67 and accompanying text. As already discussed, in 1988 
there was no life-threatening criminal activity exception to the attorney-client privilege. 
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difference between the duty and the privilege, and the State Bar's desire 
to provide an exception for the duty. The court had an opportunity to 
resolve the issue by simply stating that the privilege exceptions also 
apply to the duty of confidentiality, but it did not take it. 
Thus, by focusing on language that emphasized "privileged 
information" rather than "confidential information" or "confidentiality," 
the General Dynamics court contributed to the murkiness of the ongoing 
confidentiality-privilege debate about whether exceptions to the 
attorney-client privilege can be read into the duty of confidentiality. 
While it is possible to infer that conclusion from the opinion, 150 it is 
important to state it expressly, so lawyers have no doubt about their 
obligations when determining the scope of the duty of confidentiality.151 
D. Do the Public Policies Underlying the Life-Threatening Criminal 
Activity Exception Mandate that Such an Exception Be Implied 
to Apply to the Duty of Confidentiality? 
A formal ethics opinion of the Los Angeles County Bar Association 
concluded that an attorney may be permitted to divulge future crimes 
where it "may prevent immediate and serious injury."152 The Los 
Angeles County Bar reaffirmed this conclusion in 1985 by adopting 
current Model Rule 1.6' s standard, which allows disclosure where a 
client's criminal activity is likely to result in imminent death or 
substantial bodily harm. 153 Implicit in this standard is the recognition 
that the preservation of human life outweighs the duty of 
confidentiality.154 In essence, the Los Angeles County Bar concluded 
that even in the absence of express exceptions to Business and 
Professions Code section 6068(e), the policy of preserving human life 
outweighs the policies of candor and effective representation underlying 
the duty of confidentiality.155 While this approach is attractive-it does 
The legislature enacted the exception in September 1993, effective January 1, 1994. See 
infra notes 264-69 and accompanying text. 
150. See supra notes 141--48 and accompanying text. 
151. See infra note 167 and accompanying text. 
152. L.A. County Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 264 (1959). 
153. L.A. County Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Formal Op. 436 (1985) 
(adopting MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (1983)). 
154. See Ethics 2000, supra note 12. 
155. Implicit in this approach is the recognition that the state bar, for obvious 
reasons, would be unlikely to prosecute a lawyer whose disclosure of confidential 
information of a client's criminal act has saved a life or prevented serious bodily harm. 
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not require any statute or rule revisions-there are problems with it. 
First, in Opinion 436, the Los Angeles County Bar adopted a standard 
from the ABA's Model Rules. It is true that California Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1-100 provides that "[e]thics opinions and rules 
and standards promulgated by other jurisdictions and bar associations 
may ... be considered" by lawyers to determine what ethical courses of 
action to take. 156 Nevertheless, in General Dynamics, the California 
Supreme Court expressly declined to adopt either the Model Rules or the 
ABA Code as a predicate for retaliatory discharge claims, recognizing 
that ABA ethics codes have "no legal force of their own."157 Further, 
while other jurisdictions' rules and ethics opinions may be consulted, it 
is usually "in areas where there is no direct authority in California and 
there is no conflict with the public policy of California."158 In addition, 
although the Los Angeles County Bar Ethics Committee is well-
respected in California ethics circles for the sophistication of analysis in 
its opinions, its opinions are advisory only. 159 They are not legal 
authority. It is unlikely that the Los Angeles County Bar's position on 
this issue would provide the kind of assurance to California lawyers that 
a rule or statute would. 160 
Perhaps more important, even if the Los Angeles County Bar's 
position were to gain widespread acceptance, the members of the 
California Bar would still be left without clear guidance on how to 
proceed. Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) would still be 
absolute on its face, and a lawyer would still be unsure whether any 
actions she took in accordance with Opinion 436 might subject her to 
discipline should the State Bar decide to prosecute her. 
E. Does California Need an Express Exception to Its 
Duty of Confidentiality? 
The foregoing analyses of the plain language and legislative history 
of Evidence Code section 956.5, the California Supreme Court's 
156. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-lOO(A) (2000). 
157. Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 503 n.6 (Cal. 1994) 
(quoting l HAZARD & HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 206 (1998)). But see State 
Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 807-08 (Ct. App. 1999) (relying on 
analysis of an ABA formal ethics opinion to set a standard for future instances involving 
the inadvertent disclosure of confidential information). 
158. State Comp. Ins. Fund., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 807 (citing State Bar of Cal. 
Comm. on Prof! Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 1983-71 (1983)). 
159. Rule 1-100 also provides that for guidance on proper professional conduct, a 
lawyer should also consult opinions of ethics committees in California, even though they 
are not binding. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-IOO(A). 
160. See infra Part V for a discussion of how to implement an exception that would 
provide the necessary assurance to lawyers. 
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decision in General Dynamics, and the Los Angeles County Bar Ethics 
Opinion 436 all demonstrate that the California law concerning the 
duty of confidentiality is murky at best and confusing at worst. At 
present, lawyers in California are not provided with the kind of 
guidance afforded to lawyers in other states in deciding how to proceed 
when their clients are involved in criminal activity likely to result in 
death or serious injury. In other states, lawyers at least know they have 
the option to disclose confidential information to prevent the harm. In 
California, if lawyers agree with some commentators and trust that the 
legislature intended Evidence Code section 956.5 to apply also to 
Business and Professions Code section 6068(e),161 or if they are confident 
that in General Dynamics, the supreme court impliedly held the same, 162 
or if they consider the Los Angeles County Bar Association Commission 
on Legal Ethics Formal Opinion 436 to be persuasive, 163 then they might 
believe that they can reveal confidential client information. 
The simple fact is, however, that a lawyer cannot be certain she can 
reveal confidential information in the face of Business and Professions 
Code section 6068( e)' s strict confidentiality language. 164 If the lawyer is 
161. See supra Part III.BJ (discussing that the legislature so intended); Backstrom, 
supra note 91, at 152-53; Kerrane, supra note 83, at 832-33. But cf. Zacharias, supra 
note 78, at 380-97 (discussing the California courts' "strong presumption against 
inferring silent amendments to statutes" and concluding that "there is ample reason to 
believe a [California] court would not infer an exception to confidentiality from the mere 
adoption of section 956.5"). 
162. See Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 923 (Ct. 
App. 2001); supra Part III.C; see also Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, 
Professional Secrecy and Its Exceptions: Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. 
L. REv. 63, 125 n.196 (1998) (noting that General Dynamics "holds that all of the 
exceptions to California's statutory attorney-client privilege are also exceptions to the 
lawyer's duty of confidentiality"). 
163. See supra Part III.D. 
164. A recently decided case presented a situation that could have resulted in the 
first California appellate decision that squarely addressed whether the exception 
contained in Evidence Code section 956.5 also applies to Business and Professions Code 
section 6068(e). See People v. Dang, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
Unfortunately, the court limited its ruling to the narrow issue before it: whether, under 
section 956.5, a lawyer may testify about a client's prospective life-threatening criminal 
act, disclosing information which the client had disclosed to the lawyer in confidence. 
Id. at 767. The court answered that question in the affirmative, but in doing so, it did not 
resolve the interplay between Evidence Code section 956.5 and Business and Professions 
Code section 6068(e). Id. 
In Dang, the criminal defendant, charged with several counts, including burglary and 
false imprisonment, told his lawyer that he would try to bribe the witnesses against him 
and that "he would 'whack' the witnesses if he was not successful in bribing them." Id. 
at 765. The lawyer reported the defendant's threats to the district attorney and was 
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wrong, she may be subject to discipline for violating the duty. 
Consequently, it would be natural for a lawyer to err on the side of 
caution and preserve the client's confidential information. If preserving 
life is an important public policy as Evidence Code section 956.5's 
language suggests, then lawyers maintaining silence in the face of life-
threatening criminal activity as the norm should be unacceptable. 
Yet it has also been suggested that if indeed the exceptions apply, the 
allowed to withdraw from the representation. Id. The lawyer then testified at trial over 
the objection of the defendant. Id. at 766. The defendant was convicted and sentenced 
and timely appealed. Id. at 765. 
In holding that the lawyer's testimony was admissible under Evidence Code section 
956.5, the court recognized that there is "a possible conflict between" that section and 
Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). Id. at 767. Although the defendant's 
threats to "whack" the witnesses would appear to easily come within Evidence Code 
section 956.5, this " possible conflict" was relevant in Dang because the lawyer would 
not have been testifying in the first instance had he not voluntarily disclosed the 
defendant's confidential communication to the district attorney, thus implicating 
Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). The defendant, however, had not raised 
that issue either at trial or in his appellate brief. Id. Nor did either party appear to have 
addressed the issue at oral argument, notwithstanding the court's invitation that they do 
so. Id. Accordingly, without Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) before it, 
the court could limit its inquiry to the Evidence Code 956.5 issue and conclude that the 
lawyer properly testified about information received in a confidential client 
communication. Id. 
It appears that the court, if squarely confronted with the Business and Professions 
Code section 6068(e) issue, would have concluded that section 956.5's exception to the 
attorney-client privilege applies equally to section 6068(e)'s duty of confidentially. 
After concluding that the testimony was properly admitted, the court proceeded: 
We note that the State Bar Court has held the duty of confidentiality under 
Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) is modified by the 
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege codified in the Evidence Code. (See 
Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 314, 
106 Cal.Rptr.2d 906; see also General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court 
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164, 1191, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 876 P.2d 487 [recognizing 
exception to attorney-client privilege where attorney reasonably believes 
disclosure necessary to prevent criminal act likely to result in death or 
substantial bodily harm].) 
Id. Simply by making the foregoing observation, it is possible that the court was 
declaring that its conclusion would have been the same even if the Business and 
Professions Code section 6068(e) issue had been before it. Nevertheless, despite that 
language, lawyers in California are still left not knowing whether they can proceed to 
disclose confidential client information when confronted with a client's life-threatening 
criminal activity. First, the court's language, which was not required to resolve the 
appeal, remains dicta. Second, the court's cited references are confusing. The court 
refers to the Paladino case, which in tum cites to In re Lilly, 2 CAL. ST. B. REP. 473, 478 
(Review Dept. 1993). Paladino cites Lilly for the proposition that "the State Bar Court 
'has shown no interest in such catch-22 prosecutions. To the contrary, the court has held 
the duty of confidentiality expressed in Business and Professions Code section 6068, 
subdivision (e) is modified by the exceptions to the attorney-client privilege contained in 
the Evidence Code."' 106 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 923. Yet Lilly does not support that 
conclusion. See In re Lilly, 2 CAL. ST. B. REP. 473 (Review Dept. 1993). Finally, as 
already discussed, the Dang court's reference to General Dynamics provides no further 
enlightenment on what that case stands for. See supra Part III.C. 
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lawyer may face Tarasoff-like liability for failing to have warned third 
parties who are harmed by the client's criminal conduct. 165 Whether that 
kind of liability is likely to be imposed on a lawyer is questionable. 166 
Nevertheless, such liability remains a possibility and lawyers should be 
provided adequate guidance on how to proceed. In the absence of a 
supreme court decision that expressly holds that Evidence Code section 
956.5 applies to Business and Professions Code section 6068(e), a rule 
addition or statutory revision is required. 
Giving lawyers unambiguous guidance as to what their obligations 
are in these situations is important. Yet another consideration should 
also inform any decision by California to resolve uncertainties in the 
law of confidentiality. Although, as we have seen, there is still some 
question whether attorney-client privilege exceptions apply to the duty 
of confidentiality, California is the only state in which the duty of 
confidentiality does not have an express exception for life-threatening 
criminal activity. This may appear at best curious to the public, 
especially since California courts appear to have provided lawyers with 
exceptions to confidentiality to defend themselves.167 It may even 
appear curious to lawyers as well. At the Fourth Annual Statewide 
Ethics Symposium held in June 2000 in Fullerton, California, a 
member of a panel on the Ethics 2000 Commission asked the audience 
165. See, e.g., Backstrom, supra note 91, at 152-53; Kerrane, supra note 83, at 
832-33. As nearly any California lawyer knows (and probably any lawyer in the United 
States who attended law school after 1976), Tarasojf v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 
P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), is the case in which the California Supreme Court held that when a 
psychotherapist determines that a patient intends to harm a third person, the 
psychotherapist owes a duty to use reasonable care to protect the potential victim, 
including warning the patient, even if it means the psychotherapist must divulge 
confidential information. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345. 
166. The author is aware of no case in California or any other state in which a court 
has held a lawyer to a similar duty. Nearly every state that has a life-threatening harm 
exception to the duty of confidentiality has drafted it to be permissive, the same as 
Model Rule 1.6, so the question is whether a court would hold that a lawyer had a duty to 
warn similar to the psychotherapist in Tarasoff. Nevertheless, courts have held lawyers 
liable for failing to disclose the fraudulent acts of their clients, even where there is no 
exception to the duty of confidentiality permitting lawyers to do so. See, e.g., FDIC v. 
O'Melveny &Myers, 61 F.3d 17, 19-20 (9th Cir. 1995). 
167. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Law students studying professional 
responsibility often comment on the irony in providing lawyers an exception to defend 
themselves, but not providing an exception for life-threatening criminal activity that 
would permit lawyers to protect the public. Although, as discussed in Part III, there may 
be an implied bodily harm exception that can be parsed from California Evidence Code 
section 956.5 and General Dynamics, students rightfully note that there is no case that 
expressly so holds. See also supra note 164. 
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for a show of hands on whether California lawyers should be able to 
disclose confidential information to prevent life-threatening criminal 
activity. There was near unanimity among those present that they 
should. 
The idea that California should have such an exception should not be 
controversial. 168 The need to reveal confidential information to prevent 
serious bodily harm arising from the client's prospective criminal 
activity is not a situation that is likely to arise often. Every other 
jurisdiction has such an exception, and there is no indication that the 
attorney-client relationship or the justice system has suffered irreparable 
harm. Lawyers in California should be provided with an unmistakable 
signal from the supreme court or the legislature that when serious bodily 
harm arising from criminal activity is likely, they may disclose without 
fear of being subject to discipline. Lawyers will have certainty; they 
will have the means to protect the public. 
In summary, it is not certain whether we can assume the exception to 
the attorney-client privilege for life-threatening criminal activity applies 
equally to the duty of confidentiality, either because it can be implied 
from Evidence Code section 956.5's legislative history or because 
General Dynamics so held. Nor can lawyers presume that the public 
policy underlying a life-threatening criminal activity exception to the 
duty of confidentiality warrants an implied exception to the duty. The 
law of confidentiality in California remains uncertain. There is a need 
for a clear statement by the California Supreme Court or the legislature. 
Before proceeding to a discussion on strategies to implement an 
exception, a discussion of the nature and scope of such an exception is in 
order. 
N. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE BODILY HARM EXCEPTION THAT 
THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY SHOULD HA VE 
Having determined that there should be an expressly stated life-
threatening criminal activity exception to the lawyer's duty of 
confidentiality in California, the next question is what the scope or breadth 
of that exception should be. In this Section, the general substantive 
parameters the exception should have will be discussed; drafting and other 
strategic considerations are discussed in the next section. 
168. The emphasis here is on the word "should." In identifying legal ethical 
principles, California traditionally has been a client-centric state. The emphasis has been 
on protecting the client. As the duty of confidentiality is viewed as central to the 
attorney-client relationship and protection of the client, not even a life-threatening 
criminal activity exception will be greeted with unanimous acclaim by the bar. See infra 
Part V.A. 
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The term for the exception used throughout this Article, life-
threatening criminal activity, answers a good deal of the scope question. 
The exception should be limited to situations in which a client intends to 
commit a criminal act that is reasonably likely to result in death or 
substantial bodily injury. Before proceeding to that issue, two other 
scope issues must be considered: whether the exception should be 
permissive or mandatory, and whether the threatened harm must be 
"imminent" before disclosure is allowed. 
A. Permissive Versus Mandatory 
As an initial matter, the exception should be permissive. It should 
provide only that the lawyer may disclose confidential information. 169 
No exception should create a duty that requires the lawyer to breach 
confidentiality. Few states so require, and the current Model Rule 1.6, 
the Ethics 2000 Commission's proposed Rule 1.6, and the Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing La,wyers similarly do not mandate 
disclosure.170 Given California's strong interest in confidentiality and 
protecting the client, any rule or statutory provision should only 
authorize disclosure, and any such disclosures should be made only to 
the extent reasonably necessary to prevent the foreseen harm. 
B. Imminent Harm 
As an initial matter, this Article proposes that any life-threatening 
confidentiality exception that California might adopt include the 
threshold requirement that the harm resulting from the client's actions be 
"likely" or "reasonably certain." This is a departure from a requirement 
that the harm be "imminent," as is provided in current Model Rule 
1.6,171 but comports with the recently approved Ethics 2000 Commission 
version of the life-threatening activity exception, 172 as well as with the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.113 
169. Or, if a rule is framed more as a safe harbor rather than a direct modification of 
the duty of confidentiality, then the rule should provide that the lawyer is not subject to 
discipline should the lawyer make any confidential disclosures to prevent death or 
serious bodily injury. See infra notes 242-50 and accompanying text. 
170. See supra notes 38--67 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra Part II.B. 
172. See supra Part II.D. 
173. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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From a substantive perspective, removing "imminent" from the 
lawyer's calculus for deciding whether to disclose confidential 
information of the client would allow the lawyer to reveal such 
information where the feared harm may not occur for years, for example, 
in a situation where toxic waste is released into the environment. 17 A 
lawyer should be permitted to prevent a client from violating the law175 
in releasing toxic waste that will likely cause serious bodily harm. 
Lawyers, however, should not be put in a position where they could 
breach confidentiality upon the mere possibility that the harm may come 
to pass. In the case of an environmental tort, for example, disclosure of 
confidential client information would be permitted only when the lawyer 
can be reasonably certain that the course of environmental damage, once 
begun, will proceed to an inevitable end, resulting in harm to the public 
by causing death or other serious injury. As already noted, 176 both the 
Ethics 2000 Commission proposal and the Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers have removed the "imminent" modifier from 
the rule and provide that the threat to life need only be "reasonably 
certain." 177 
From a procedural point of view, eliminating the imminent 
requirement would conform the confidentiality exception to Evidence 
Code section 956.5. As noted, Evidence Code section 956.5 provides 
there is no attorney-client privilege if the lawyer reasonably believes a 
client's criminal act "is likely to result in death or substantial bodily 
harm." 178 As will also be discussed, in rejecting the 1987 Rule 3-100 
proposal, the California Supreme Court voiced its concern about 
174. See Ethics 2000, supra note 12 ("Such harm is reasonably certain to occur if it 
will be suffered imminently or if there is a present and substantial threat that a person 
will suffer such harm at a later date if the lawyer fails to take action necessary to 
eliminate the threat." (quoting language from a proposed addition to comment 6 of 
Model Rule 1.6)). 
175. As discussed in Part IV.C, retaining the "criminal act" limitation in the 
exception is important to maintaining a strong attorney-client relationship in the face of 
eliminating an imminence requirement. See infra notes 190-204 and accompanying text. 
176. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
177. Each version of the proposed rule 3-100 also rejected an imminent harm 
requirement, providing only that the lawyer reasonably believe that a client's criminal 
act "is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm." STATE BAR OF CAL. OFACE 
OF PROF'L COMPETENCE, PLANNING & DEV., supra note 83 at enclosures 4, 6, 9 
(emphasis added); see infra notes 240-50 and accompanying text. Moreover, both the 
Ethics 2000 Commission and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers use 
a toxic waste hypothetical in their comments and illustrations, respectively. See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 6 (2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING Lawyers§ 66 illus. 3 (1998); Ethics 2000, supra note 12. 
178. CAL. Evm. CODE§ 956.5 (West 1995) (emphasis added); see supra note 81 
and accompanying text. 
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adopting a rule of confidentiality that would be "inconsistent with" the 
legislature's intent in having enacted the attorney-client privilege.179 It 
is unlikely that an exception to the duty of confidentiality, at least one 
contained in a rule of professional conduct, would pass muster with the 
California Supreme Court unless at a minimum it conforms to the 
language in Evidence Code section 956.5. 
There are, however, proponents of retaining the stricter imminent 
standard found in current Model Rule 1.6. 180 Their arguments focus on 
the duty of loyalty lawyers owe each of their clients. While lawyers are 
also officers of the court, owing certain duties to the legal system, 
proponents of an imminent standard argue that a lawyer should not act as 
a law enforcement officer against the lawyer's own client. 181 The 
potential for such disclosures, they argue, would weaken the bond of 
trust that the duty of loyalty fosters. 182 The client should be able to feel 
that the lawyer is available to provide legal advice and will preserve the 
client's confidences. If clients believed their lawyers could disclose to 
third parties the confidential information they have revealed to their 
lawyers to obtain legal advice, they will refrain from giving their 
lawyers information the lawyers need to properly fulfill their counseling 
function. Clients will "withhold from their lawyers information that 
clients think will be harmful or embarrassing if they suspect that their 
lawyers will use that information for any purpose other than to further 
the interests of a client."183 
Nevertheless, proponents of an imminent standard concede that 
179. See STATE BAR OF CAL. OFFICE OF PROF'L COMPETENCE, PLANNING & DEV., 
supra note 83, at 10-11 (citing Letter from the California Supreme Court, to Terry 
Anderlini, President, State Bar of California (June 9, 1998)); see also infra notes 241, 
259-67 and accompanying text. 
180. See, e.g., PASTERNAK, supra note 67, at 2-3. The L.A. County Bar 
Association's motion was filed with the Ethics 2000 Commission just prior to the ABA's 
August 2001 annual meeting, at which the ABA's House of Delegates considered the 
commission's proposed revisions to the Model Rules. See also Letter from Harry B. 
Sondheim, Chair of California State Bar Standing Committee on Professional 
Responsibility and Conduct, to ABA Ethics 2000 Commission (Jan. 13, 1999), at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/selegue.htm1 [hereinafter Letter from Harry B. Sondheim]. 
The proposed rule, without an imminence limitation, passed the ABA's House of 
Delegates by a vote of243 to 184. See Glater, supra note 1, at A12. 
181. See PASTERNAK, supra note 67, at 2; Letter from Harry B. Sondheim, supra 
note 180. 
182. PASTERNAK, supra note 67, at 2; Letter from Harry B. Sondheim, supra note 
180; see also supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
183. PASTERNAK, supra note 67, at 2. 
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under certain circumstances, the lawyer might be the last person 
standing between the client's actions and the threatened harm. 184 
Under those circumstances, a temporally limiting imminent standard 
would allow lawyers to disclose confidential client information. 
Before such time as the lawyer is the "last resort," however, there are 
alternatives for preventing the client's actions, such as law enforcement 
authorities, the regulatory authorities of the client's industry, and even 
nonlawyer employee whistle blowers. Otherwise, lawyers' 
effectiveness in counseling clients on the legal and ethical implications 
of their chosen courses of action may be lost. Society in the long run 
would suffer from this loss of legal advice. 185 
Despite the appeal of these arguments, the public's interest in 
preventing the client from following a criminal course of action, the 
effects of which might not be felt for years, warrants the removal of the 
imminence standard. The arguments for an imminent standard ignore 
the significance of the illustration both the Ethics 2000 Commission and 
the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers have used: the 
release of toxic waste into the environment. 186 True, there may be others 
within a corporate client, such as a nonlawyer employee, who are not so 
constrained as a lawyer from disclosing confidential information. 
However, the use of the modifier "imminent" suggests that the death or 
substantial bodily harm will occur in the near future. 187 This limitation 
is problematic because even though the harm that results from the 
client's acts may not manifest itself for years-for example, death or a 
debilitating disease from contact with the toxic waste-immediate 
disclosure may be "necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the 
number of victims." 188 Removing the temporal limitation would allow a 
184. Id. 
185. Id. The L.A. County Bar Association set forth several other arguments 
favoring an imminence requirement as follows: 
First, there is a risk of harm to the client if the lawyer is mistaken as to the 
facts or their consequence and discloses confidential information based on that 
mistaken belief. Second, there is a similar risk of harm to others including, for 
example, shareholders of publicly owned corporations, and a related risk of 
violating the securities laws. Third, the disclosures that would be authorized 
by the proposed revisions might violate other provisions of law. For example, 
California Health & Safety Code § 120980 makes it a crime in certain 
situations to disclose the results of an HIV test. 
Id. at 3. 
186. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 6 (2001); REsTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 66, illus. 3 (1989); Ethics 2000, supra 
note 12. 
187. The Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary defines "imminent" to mean 
"ready to take place; esp[ecially]: hanging threateningly over one's head." MERRIAM-
WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 602 (9th ed. 1985). 
188. MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 6 (2001); REsTATEMENT(THIRD) 
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lawyer to take necessary steps to prevent "reasonably certain" or "likely" 
harm from occurring. Such a rule would allow lawyers to reveal 
confidential information-if necessary-so they do not have to wait for 
another employee of an organizational client to blow the whistle or for 
the authorities to uncover the client's conduct. 189 
Removing the imminent standard, moreover, should not interfere with 
the attorney-client relationship, subverting the lawyer's role as the 
client's counselor, as some of the imminent standard's proponents fear. 
Retaining the current Model Rule's requirement that the client not 
merely act, but instead that the client's acts be criminal in nature, should 
address those concerns. 
OFTIIE LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS § 66 illus. 3 (1988); Ethics 2000, supra note 12. This is 
a particular concern if the severity of the effect of exposure is cumulative over time. 
189. It is arguable that even with an imminent standard in the exception, a lawyer 
would still be allowed to disclose a client's criminal activities that are reasonably certain 
to result in death or substantial bodily harm. It would involve, however, a tortured 
interpretation of the word "imminent." To include harm not expected to arise for several 
years within the purview of an exception with an imminent limitation, the word would 
have to be deemed to mean not only harm that is "ready to take place," MERRIAM-
WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 602 (9th ed. 1985), but also "inevitable" harm that 
will be imminently put in motion by the client's act (or failure to act). For example, if 
the lawyer learned from an employee of a corporate client that the client has plans to 
release toxic waste into the environment in the near future, which the lawyer determines 
is likely to cause serious injury to the public but not for several years, and the lawyer is 
unsuccessful in persuading the client to dispose of the waste properly, then it could be 
argued that a course of conduct that will lead to inevitable harm will imminently be put 
in motion and the lawyer would then be allowed to disclose the confidential infonnation 
to the extent necessary to prevent the toxic release or the aggravation of harm. The same 
reasoning would apply to a situation where the client has already released toxic waste 
into the environment, whether intentionally or inadvertently. Assuming the lawyer has 
unsuccessfully tried to persuade the client to report the release or otherwise to take steps 
to rectify the situation, it can still be argued that the course of conduct leading to 
inevitable harm to the public (here, the client's failure to take appropriate action) has 
been put in motion. The problem with the foregoing analysis is that such an 
interpretation of imminent effectively removes the word as a modifier for harm. The 
word might just as well be removed from the rule, as already argued above. 
Nevertheless, keeping imminent in the black Jetter rule, but explaining its "expanded" 
meaning in a comment, might serve a purpose. Having the word in the black letter-the 
part of a rule that a lawyer would read first-would signal to the lawyer that a decision 
to breach confidentiality should not be taken lightly as not every kind of harm will (or 
should) trigger the exception. That cautionary function, however, can just as easily be 
realized by retaining from tile current Model Rule 1.6, the requirement that the harm be 
tile result of tile client's criminal activity. See infra notes 190-211 and accompanying text. 
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C. Criminal Act 
Current Model Rule 1.6 permits a lawyer to disclose confidential 
client information only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes 
necessary "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act" that "is 
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm." 190 Both 
the Ethics 2000 Commission and the Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers, however, have removed the requirement that the 
client's conduct be criminal. Under their approach, lawyers would be 
able to disclose confidential client information to prevent client acts that 
are legal, as well as criminal acts. The only limitation would be that the 
harm that might result is "reasonably certain." 
The problem with this approach is apparent. Giving lawyers the right 
to determine what is in the client's best interests, and allowing them to 
take action on that determination without the client's consent, flies in the 
face of the traditional allocation of responsibilities and authority 
between lawyer and client. 
An effective attorney-client relationship depends on the appropriate 
allocation of responsibility between lawyer and client. Generally 
speaking, when a lawyer's advice is sought, the lawyer first must give a 
reasoned consideration of the law in light of the facts. After such 
consideration, the lawyer can then provide the advice to the client to 
help the client decide how to proceed in the matter for which the client 
sought the lawyer's assistance. The advice the lawyer provides should be 
based on the prevailing law, the particular facts of the matter on which the 
client seeks advice, and on the lawyer's knowledge of surrounding 
circumstances. While the lawyer can recommend a particular course (in 
fact, it is the lawyer's duty to communicate with and advise the client) 191 
it is the client's sole right to make the final decision regarding anything 
that may affect the client's substantive rights. 192 This is true regardless of 
the relative knowledge and experience of the lawyer and client. Even if 
the lawyer is extremely knowledgeable and the client is relatively 
unsophisticated, it is the client who is empowered to make the ultimate 
decision about how to proceed. 
Removing the criminal act limitation could turn the lawyer-client 
relationship on its head. If the lawyer is not constrained by that 
limitation, then even where the client is acting legally, the lawyer could 
190. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (emphasis added). 
191. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(m) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); 
CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-500, 3-510; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 14; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20. 
192. Blanton v. Womancare Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 654 (Cal. 1985); see also MODEL 
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2( a) & cmt. 1. 
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force the client to make decisions the client does not want to make-
based simply on the lawyer's assessment that death or harm is likely to 
follow .193 There are few products sold that would not, under some 
circumstances, cause death or serious injury. It is virtually impossible to 
make a perfectly safe product, and manufacturers often must make 
decisions involving cost-benefit analyses. Reasonable people can differ 
about where to draw the line as to when the dangers inherent in a 
product outweigh the benefits it provides ( or the profit it can accrue for 
the manufacturer). 
The model for, a lawyer and client in this situation has been 
described. 194 The client will be candid with the lawyer because the 
client knows that the lawyer is duty bound to preserve information the 
client has communicated confidentially. The lawyer can then use that 
information in an attempt to persuade the client not to proceed as 
planned, or, in the case where a toxic substance has been released, to 
persuade the client to take action to remedy the situation and prevent the 
harm that likely will result.195 
In attempting to persuade the client, the lawyer may go beyond a 
simple discussion of the legal consequences to point out the 
consequences-financial, reputational, and others-that can accompany 
a decision to proceed with the client's proposed course of action. 196 
193. There are recent examples of cases where businesses have made what can at 
best be described as poor decisions in this regard, leading to the sale of products that 
resulted in severe injuries resulting in enormous judgments or the potential for enormous 
judgments. See, e.g., Myron Levin, A History of Fiery Deaths on the Road, L.A. TIMES, 
Apr. 29, 2001, at Al; Ann W. O'Neill et al., GM Ordered to Pay $4.9 Billion in Crash 
Verdict, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1999, at Al. It is precisely these kinds of cases, however, 
that a lawyer can marshal in persuading clients on how they should proceed. The lawyer 
can make the client aware that in the current litigation atmosphere, juries generally will 
not accept as reasonable a manufacturer's decision to save a few dollars per product at a 
high risk (or to the jurors after the fact, an apparent high risk) of death. See, e.g., Levin, 
supra, at Al. This is not to suggest the countenancing of the actions of the lawyers who 
represented the tobacco companies and assisted their clients in concealing information. 
See infra note 201. What they did was wrong. But providing an exception that does not 
require a criminal act predicate would not have changed the conduct of those lawyers, 
who actively assisted their tobacco company clients in concealing information that 
should have been produced during discovery. 
194. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text. 
195. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 14. 
196. See, e.g., id. R. 2.1 (addressing the lawyer as advisor, providing that, "In 
representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and 
render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to 
other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be 
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Indeed, given the seeming spate of instances involving, for example, 
automobiles, where the corporation has pursued a course of conduct that 
has proven very damaging to the corporation, not only legally (lost 
lawsuits), but also financially and reputationally, 197 a lawyer would have 
a large arsenal of arguments to use in persuading the client. The lawyer, 
however, will be unable to employ those arguments if the client, fearing 
the lawyer will go public, decides to keep its legal advisers in the dark. 
The lawyer cannot sway a client without information. For the lawyer to 
obtain that information, the client must trust in the lawyer and believe 
that the lawyer will keep confidential the information that the client 
communicates. That, as already pointed out, is the policy rationale 
underlying both the duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client 
privilege. 
It is not surprising that, while a dozen or so states have modified 
Model Rule 1.6 by removing its imminent limitation, 198 only four states 
have completely removed the requirement that the client engage in a 
criminal activity before the exception is triggered. 199 Removing the 
criminal activity limitation from a life-threatening exception to the duty 
of confidentiality would disrupt the balance that currently exists in the 
attorney-client relationship. Without the criminal activity limitation, a 
lawyer would have the ability, without fear of discipline, to disclose 
information about a client's lawful actions, so long as the lawyer 
reasonably believes the client's actions will lead to death or serious 
injury. A client's assessment of the same situation may differ from that 
of the lawyer. For example, the client may have taken into consideration 
that some death or injury is unavoidable, but has decided to proceed; 
such business decisions are made all the time. But that would not 
matter; the lawyer could use the threat of disclosing confidential 
information to, in essence, make business decisions for the client based 
on the lawyer's own estimation of the benefits and risks to the public. 
Giving the lawyer that power would turn the fundamental allocation of 
authority between lawyer and client on its head, an unfair result, as it is a 
rare product that is 100% safe.200 Manufacturers often have to balance 
relevant to the client's situation"); see also id. R. 2.1 cmts. 1-5 (discussing the scope of 
advice the lawyer may give). 
197. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
198. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
199. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
200. The topsy-turvy effect on the lawyer-client relationship of removing the 
criminal act requirement from the confidentiality exception is perhaps most apparent 
where the client is an organization. There is usually someone within the organization 
who is responsible for making decisions on behalf of the organization. It is in that 
person that the decision-making authority is properly reposed. It is not the lawyer's 
place to substitute her opinions on proper conduct for those of the organization's 
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benefits and risks in bringing a product to market. Such balancing is not 
illegal even if the product that is marketed contains some risk. Absent a 
requirement that the client's acts be criminal, clients such as tobacco 
companies, gun manufacturers, and chemical companies would be denied 
the same attorney-client relationship to which all persons within our legal 
decision-maker. If the lawyer believes the decision-maker is in error, then the ethics 
rules provide her with a road map on the course to take. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13; CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-600 (1999). The 
Restatement (Third) section 96(3), has also addressed this issue in similar fashion. 
REsTA1EMENT (THIRD) OFTIIELAW GOVERNING LAWYERS§ 96(3) (1998). 
California Rule 3-600 is an example of an ethical rule that provides guidance to 
lawyers who represent organizations. It provides that if the lawyer knows that a person 
acting on behalf of the corporation intends to act (or refuses to act) in a way that is a 
violation of law imputable to the organization or in a way that is likely to result in 
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may urge the person to reconsider 
the matter or refer the matter to the highest internal authority that can act on behalf of the 
organization. CAL. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 3-600 (1999). Paragraph (B) of Rule 
3-600 provides: 
(B) If a member acting on behalf of an organization knows that an actual or 
apparent agent of the organization acts or intends or refuses to act in a manner 
that is or may be a violation of law reasonably imputable to the organization, 
or in a manner which is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, 
the member shall not violate his or her duty of protecting all confidential 
information as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6068, 
subdivision (e). Subject to Business and Professions Code section 6068, 
subdivision (e), the member may take such actions as appear to the member to 
be in the best lawful interest of the organization. Such actions may include 
among others: 
(1) Urging reconsideration of the matter while explaining its likely 
consequences to the organization; or 
(2) Referring the matter to the next higher authority in the organization, 
including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the 
highest internal authority that can act on behalf of the organization. 
Id. R. 3-600(B). Model Rule 1.13 is to substantially the same effect. See MODEL RULES 
OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.13. 
These various ethical rules concerning the organization as client have a cardinal 
principle in common: the lawyer may not violate her duty of confidentiality in taking 
action to resolve the situation. The courses of conduct permitted lawyers under these 
rules all must be taken within the confines of the client organization; the lawyer is not 
permitted to externally disclose information protected by the duty of confidentiality. The 
rules recognize that decisions in an organization are made by authorized representatives 
of that organization; unless specifically so authorized to make decisions for the 
organization, the lawyer's only course is to pursue the approved course of conduct or 
resign. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c); CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 
R. 3-600(C) (1999). However, the lawyer's silence is mandated only if the information 
the lawyer has in her possession is subject to the duty of confidentiality. As discussed 
previously, a client has no expectation in the preservation of confidential information 
where the client is involved in criminal activity. See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior 
Court, 876 P.2d 487,503 (Cal. 1994); supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text. 
359 
system are entitled.201 Indeed, it is possible they would effectively be 
denied the benefits of the attorney-client privilege. And it would not just 
be manufacturers of inherently dangerous products. Not conditioning the 
exception on a crime could adversely affect any business that "in the 
climate of the day might be involved in controversial activities."202 It 
could also affect any business whose product or service has implicit 
risks of death or life-health care providers, health insurance companies, 
airlines, and the like.203 
Where the client plans to engage in a criminal act that will result in 
death or serious bodily harm, however, the lawyer should be allowed to 
breach confidentiality to prevent serious bodily harm from resulting. 
In those situations, the client would have no reasonable expectation 
that the attorney is bound by a duty of confidentiality.204 No client 
should expect that it can rely on its lawyer to assist it in a course of 
criminal conduct that threatens human life.205 A lawyer disclosing 
confidential information in these limited circumstances should not 
leave the client feeling betrayed. With a criminal act limitation in 
place, both the client and the lawyer will have been put on notice that 
if the client en&ages in criminal conduct, the client cannot expect 
confidentiality.2 ° Conversely, the criminal act limitation will remind 
201. It might be argued that the practices of concealment in which tobacco 
companies engaged for many years is a strong argument why there should be few 
limitations on allowing a lawyer to disclose confidential client information to prevent 
harm. See, e.g., Richard A. Zitrin & Carol M. Langford, Ethics in Ashes: Big Tobacco's 
Lawyers Hide Behind the Cloak of Privilege, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1988, at 46. The problem 
with that argument is that the tobacco lawyers were willing participants in the 
concealment. Even if those lawyers were operating under the Ethics 2000 Commission 
or the Restatement (Third) 's rules that have removed the criminal activity limitation, they 
would not have disclosed the information. 
202. PASTANAK, supra note 67. 
203. Id. 
204. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 504 (noting that any such expectation is 
"misplaced"). 
205. See, e.g., United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 634 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming a 
lawyer's conviction for obstructing justice, the court stated: "We refuse to accept the notion 
that lawyers may do anything, including violating the law, to zealously advocate their 
clients' interests and then avoid criminal prosecution by claiming that they were 'just doing 
their job'"); United States v. Morris, 988 F.2d 1335, 1336 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing the 
marital privilege in a case concerning a lawyer charged in a drug conspiracy based on real 
estate work he did on house where crack cocaine was being manufactured). 
206. The supreme court in Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d 487, appears to suggest that a 
client cannot expect a lawyer to stand by when it discloses to the lawyer confidential 
information for the purposes of committing a crime. The court stated: 
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Although their revelation in the course of a retaliatory discharge suit may do 
lasting damage to the expectations of the corporate client (or, more likely, a 
corporate executive) that disclosures to counsel would remain inviolate, a 
concern for protecting the fiduciary aspects of the relationship in the case of a 
client who confides in counsel for the purpose of planning a crime or 
practicing a fraud is misplaced; such disclosures do not violate the privilege. 
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the lawyer that the confidentiality exception is not a license to usurp 
the client's decision-making authority. 
The possibility that the lawyer will reveal such information if the 
client engages in life-threatening criminal conduct should not prevent 
the vast majority of clients from providing their lawyers with all the 
information the lawyer needs to provide the client with competent advice 
on how to proceed. Thus, a criminal activity limitation will serve the 
purposes of protecting the public without undermining the attorney-
client relationship. 
Turning to the toxic waste hypothetical illustrations used both by the 
Ethics 2000 Commission and in the Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers,207 we can see that a criminal activity limitation 
would not necessarily prevent a lawyer from disclosing information to 
prevent or reduce the number of deaths or injuries. Generally, 
businesses that handle toxic substances are highly regulated.208 In most, 
if not all situations where there is a toxic waste spill, regulations require 
the business responsible for the spill to report it to the regulatory 
authority or take necessary steps to protect the public.209 In California, 
dumping hazardous waste can lead to imprisonment, a fine, or both.210 
Failure to report an inadvertent spill will subject the client to civil 
penalties,211 and in some instances, criminal penalties. Thus, even with a 
criminal act limitation, if a lawyer learns that the organizational client 
has released a toxic substance into the environment that poses a serious 
threat to the public, and the client has not disclosed that information to 
the relevant authorities, the lawyer could reveal that information to the 
extent necessary to prevent or, in some cases, to lessen the harm.212 
Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 504. 
207. See sources cited supra note 186. 
208. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6922k (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
209. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTII & SAFEfY CODE§§ 25359.4(b), 25507(a) (West 1999 
& Supp. 2002). 
210. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 374.3(h)(l) (West 1999 & Supp. 2002). Under the 
statute, the "fine is mandatory and shall amount to not less than five hundred dollars 
($500) nor more than one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) upon a first 
conviction." Id. 
211. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTII & SAFEfY CODE§ 25359.4(d). 
212. Under the proposed exception, the lawyer would be limited to disc;losing 
prospective criminal acts of the client that are likely to result in substantial bodily harm 
or death. Even with this limitation, a potential problem may arise under certain 
situations. Consider, for example, the case where the lawyer becomes aware through the 
representation of the client that the client had discharged toxic waste into the 
environment several times in the past but never reported it to the appropriate authorities, 
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In summary, retammg the criminal act limitation from the current 
Model Rules preserves the traditional allocation of authority between 
client and lawyer. It prevents the lawyer from making decisions for the 
client based on the lawyer's own beliefs. It provides notice to both the 
client and lawyer that the client who engages in criminal activity cannot 
have any expectation of confidentiality. Just as important, it reminds the 
lawyer that he may not reveal confidential information where there is no 
criminal act.213 
nor take the client any steps to rectify the spillage. Assuming the lawyer knows the 
discharge is likely to cause death in the future and that the law requires the client to 
report each incidence of such discharges, the client has been committing criminal acts by 
not making the reports. If the lawyer remonstrates with the client but the client refuses 
to take appropriate remedial action, and the lawyer then discloses the spills to the 
authorities, then the lawyer arguably will be disclosing a past criminal act-instances of 
nonreporting. Moreover, the disclosure of a past criminal act would be even more 
apparent in a case where the client deliberately discharged toxins into the environment. 
Similarly, in the bomb-planting hypothetical discussed previously, see supra note 4 and 
accompanying text, the lawyer could prevent a potentially murderous act by the client 
through disclosure to the authorities. At the same time, however, the lawyer arguably 
would be revealing a completed criminal act, attempted murder, by disclosing that the 
client had planted the timed incendiary device. Put another way, in some cases, 
disclosure of prospective criminal acts will necessarily result in disclosure of past 
criminal acts. 
It is true that our legal system places great import on the lawyer preserving the client's 
confidential information, particularly information of past criminal acts the client has 
disclosed to the lawyer. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, in 
those limited instances where the client's continued inaction will not only result in 
reasonably likely death or substantial bodily harm (where, for example, the discharged 
toxin has been shown likely to cause death in the future), but also continues to constitute 
a criminal act (for example, failure to report or past deliberate discharges in violation of 
law), the scales should tip in favor of disclosure. Preservation of innocent lives should 
trump the preservation of client confidences in these narrow circumstances. The 
exception would not allow wholesale disclosure of clients' past criminal acts. They 
would be disclosed only where those past acts continue to threaten life, and the lawyer 
would be able to disclose client confidences only to the extent it is necessary to prevent 
the client's prospective act. On balance, both policies-protection of client confidences 
and protection of life-will be vindicated. 
213. The proposed exception would limit the lawyer to reporting prospective criminal 
acts by the client. At the ABA's February 2002 mid-year meeting in Philadelphia, the Los 
Angeles County Bar Association (LACBA) submitted a motion to reconsider the Ethics 
2000 Commission's amendment to Model Rule 1.6(b) that was approved by the ABA 
House of Delegates at its 2001 annual meeting. AM. BAR Ass'N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 
ADDfTIONAL AMENDMENT TO Ennes 2000 PROPOSAL (REPORT 401) (2002) ( on file with the 
author) (stating the proposed amendment to Rule 1.6 by the Los Angeles County Bar). In 
its motion, the LACBA proposed that the criminal act limitation (a limitation rejected at the 
ABA's August 2001 annual meeting) it was proposing should not be restricted to the acts 
of the client. The LACBA proposed that Rule 1.6(b)(l) should provide: "(b)A lawyer may 
reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent reaseaaely eertaia imminent death or 
substantial bodily harm resulting from a criminal act." Id. The foregoing language 
would allow a lawyer to disclose a prospective criminal act not only by the client, but 
also by a third person, which the lawyer discovered in the course of the representation of 
the client. This Article is not in substantive disagreement with this proposal. If a lawyer 
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D. Definition of "Confidential Information" 
There is a final issue on the scope of the life-threatening criminal 
activity exception: it should also include a definition of "confidential 
information" so that lawyers will be on notice concerning the kind of 
information that comes within the scope of the duty's protection. At 
present, unlike the Model Rules,214 the ABA Code215 or the Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers,216 Business and Professions 
Code section 6068(e) provides no definition. Two California State Bar 
ethics opinions have considered section 6068( e )' s reference to 
"confidence" and "secrets" and concluded that "maintaining confidence" 
of the client refers to the lawyer not doing anything that would "breach 
the trust reposed in him or her by the client,"217 while "secrets" refers to 
"information gained in the professional relationships [sic] . . . the 
disclosure which would be embarrassing and would be likely to be 
detrimental to the client. "218 
is aware of a crime that is about to be committed and which is likely to result in death or 
serious bodily injury, the lawyer should not be foreclosed from disclosing that 
information simply because the prospective crime is to be committed by one other than 
the client. This Article proposes for now, however, that any proposed exception to the 
duty of confidentiality in California be limited to prospective criminal acts by the client. 
As already noted, see supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text, Evidence Code 
section 956.5 provides that there is no attorney-client privilege if the lawyer reasonably 
believes disclosure of a confidential client communication is necessary "to prevent the 
client from committing a criminal act that ... is likely to result in death or substantial 
bodily harm." CAL. EVID. CODE§ 956.5 (West 1995). It is unlikely that an exception to 
the duty of confidentiality would pass muster with the California Supreme Court unless, 
at a minimum, it conforms to the language in Evidence Code section 956.5. 
214. The Model Rules provide that the duty of confidentiality covers "information 
relating to representation of a client." See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 
(2001); supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text. 
215. DR 4-lOl(A) includes within its scope of protection both information 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and "secrets." See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L 
REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-lOl(A) (1981); see also supra notes 20-21 and accompanying 
text. 
216. Section 59 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers defines 
"confidential information" to mean "information relating to representation of a client, 
other than information that is generally known." REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS§ 59 (1998). 
217. State Bar of Cal. Compendium on Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 1988-96 
(Mar. 1989); State Bar of Cal. Compendium on Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 1986-
87 (June 1987). 
218. State Bar of Cal. Compendium on Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 1988-96 
(Mar. 1989); State Bar of Cal. Compendium on Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 1986-
87 (June 1987) (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBlLITY, DR 4-lOl(A)). The 
definition of "secrets" the bar adopted is the definition contained in the Model Code, 
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A better definition that would communicate to California lawyers 
precisely what kind of information is to be protected was included in the 
1998 proposal to add Rule 3-100 to the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
That proposal provided that: 
"confidential information" means information related to the representation of a 
client that: (1) is subject to the lawyer-client privilege, or (2) has been acquired 
from any source, and (a) which the client has requested be held inviolate, or (b) 
the disclosure of which is likely to be embarrassing or detrimental to the 
client.219 
That definition is preferable because it combines the best of both Model 
Rule 1.6 and ABA Code DR 4-101. 
First, it includes the broad definition included in Model Rule 1.6, 
"information relating to representation," which is not restricted to 
information that is learned from the client.220 It thus emphasizes that it 
applies to any information relevant to the representation of the client, 
regardless of its source. Unlike the Model Rule, however, it does not 
stop with the broad definition. Subparagraphs (1) and (2) spell out 
precisely what is covered: attorney-client privileged communications 
and information from any other source. As to the latter information, so 
long as it is embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client, the 
client need not request that it be kept inviolate. The definition's breadth 
and specificity will put lawyers on notice as to precisely what 
information they must protect when honoring their duty of confidentiality. 
In summary, an exception to the duty of confidentiality for life-
threatening criminal activity should be just that. A lawyer's authority to 
disclose confidential information should be limited to the client's 
prospective criminal acts, though disclosure should not require that harm 
be imminent. It should also include a definition of "confidential 
information" that is both broad, yet at the same time, precise. 
Having determined that California should have an exception and 
having described the proposed scope of that exception, this Article will 
now address strategies for implementing the exception. 
although it redacted the clause that states "that the client has requested be held 
inviolate." See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-lOl(A) ("'[S]ecret' refers 
to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested 
be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to 
be detrimental to the client."). The LACBA adopted the definition of DR 4-IOl(A), 
which also defines "confidence" as referring "to information protected by the attorney-
client privilege under applicable law." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-
IOI(A). 
219. See STATE BAR OF CAL. OFFICE OF PROF'L COMPETENCE, PLANNING & DEV., 
supra note 83, at enclosure 1. 
220. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. 
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V. IMPLEMENTING THE EXCEPTION: NOT AS EASY AS IT 
MIGHT APPEAR 
Part II of this Article described the parameters of the life-threatening 
criminal activity exception in other jurisdictions and discussed how 
California has no express exception to its duty of confidentiality that 
would allow a lawyer to disclose confidential information to prevent a 
client's life-threatening criminal activity. Part ill demonstrated that the 
life-threatening criminal activity exception to the attorney-client 
privilege probably does not apply to Business and Professions Code 
section 6068(e), and concluded that at any rate, the uncertainty in the 
law of confidentiality in California warrants an express life-threatening 
activity exception to its duty of confidentiality. Part IV considered the 
nature and scope of such an exception, concluding it should be 
permissive, and should retain the criminal activity limitation but not the 
imminent standard of current Model Rule 1.6, and should contain a 
definition of "confidential information." This Part of the Article now 
considers how such an exception could be implemented. 
There are several ways to implement a confidentiality exception. 
First, the legislature could amend Business and Professions Code section 
6068(e) to provide for an express exception.221 Second, the California 
Supreme Court could adopt a rule of professional conduct that either 
provides an express exception to 6068( e) or immunizes the disclosing 
lawyer from discipline.222 Third, amending section 6068( e ), in concert 
with the adoption of a rule of professional conduct is yet another 
possibility.223 
Although the latter approach would come closest to avoiding problems 
of conflicting authority inherent in California's unique dual regulatory 
framework,224 none of these approaches are completely satisfactory. To 
avoid the problems inherent in the dual regulatory system, a fourth 
approach is suggested, involving the repeal of section 6068(e), effective 
upon the adoption of a rule of professional conduct.225 
221. See infra Part V.A. 
222. See infra Part V.B.4. 
223. See infra Part V.C.1. 
224. California's unique regulatory system involving both legislatively enacted 
statutes and court-adopted rules of professional conducts is discussed supra notes 72-
76 and accompanying text. 
225. See infra Part V.C.2. 
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A. Amending Section 6068( e) 
The most direct approach to implementing an exception to the duty of 
confidentiality is to amend Business and Professions Code section 
6068(e), either by revising the section itself or by enacting a separate 
section that creates the exception.226 Professor Roger Cramton has 
argued in favor of such an approach and has proposed language for such 
an amended section.227 Professor Cramton's proposal cuts a much 
broader swath than the exception this Article envisions. Putting aside 
the merits of the scope or the language of his proposed exception, 
however, it is debatable whether an amendment of Business and 
Professions Code section 6068(e) could be enacted. 
Section 6068(e) has been part of California's Business and 
Professions Code since 1873. It is part of section 6068, which is titled 
"Duties of Attorney" and which, in fifteen separate paragraphs, lists 
duties of California lawyers. In the nearly 130 years section 6068(e) has 
been California law, it has not been amended. There have been attempts 
to amend or modify the effect of section 6068(e), but they have proven 
unsuccessful. For example, during the 1999-2000 legislative session, 
Assembly Member Tony Strickland introduced Assembly Bill (AB) 
1286, which would have required "a lawyer to reveal to a law 
enforcement agency information regarding the location of a person 
missing against his or her will, and to reveal the identity of the person 
who has that information."228 Initially fashioned as an amendment to the 
Evidence Code,229 it was amended on April 26, 1999, to instead provide 
for a new section 6068.5. That section would have modified section 
6068(e) by providing that, notwithstanding any other provision of law 
(presumably, section 6068(e)), a lawyer has a duty to report to a law 
226. This latter strategy was the approach taken by the sponsors of Assembly Bill 
1286, discussed infra notes 227-41 and accompanying text, and Assembly Bill 363, a 
bill that when first introduced proposed an exception to the duty of confidentiality by 
providing that, notwithstanding their duties under section 6068(e), government lawyers 
could report improper governmental activity. See Assemb. B. 363, 2001 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2001), available at http://www.Ieginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_035 I-0400/ab_363_bill_ 
20010220_introduced.html. Both bills proposed a section 6068.5 that would have 
created the respective exception to Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). See 
infra note 291 for the subsequent history of Assembly Bill 363. 
227. See Roger C. Cramton, Proposed Legislation Concerning a Lawyer's Duty of 
Confidentiality, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 1467, 1473-76 (1995). It is not certain whether 
Professor Cramton still believes such an amendment is necessary, given his subsequent 
statement that General Dynamics probably held that the exceptions to California's 
attorney-client privilege also apply to its duty of confidentiality. See Cramton & 
Knowles, supra note 162, at 126 n.196. 
228. See Hearing Before the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, 1999-2000 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. May 13, 1999) (discussing Assembly Bill 1286). 
229. It would have added a new section 964 to the California Evidence Code. 
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enforcement agency information about a missing person and to identify 
any person, including a client of the lawyer, whom the lawyer 
reasonably believes has information about that missing person.230 It was 
subsequently amended to take its original approach, that is, adding a section 
to the Evidence Code.231 The Evidence Code amendment permitted, but 
did not require, that the lawyer report to the law enforcement agency.232 
Nevertheless, it failed to gain passage in the committee and expired.233 
As with the life-threatening criminal activity exception with which 
this Article is concerned, AB 1286 evinced a concern for life of a third 
person.234 It attempted to carve out an exception either to the duty of 
confidentiality or to the attorney-client privilege. Its failure, however, 
does not necessarily mean that a proposed revision of Business and 
Professions Code section 6068(e) to permit the life-threatening 
criminal activity exception would similarly fail. Arguably, AB 1286 
was not a bill that should have passed. It was an impassioned reaction to 
a notorious crime that would have unnecessarily invaded the duty of 
confidentiality. Its rejection in the committee may simply have reflected 
cooler heads acting to prevent the passage of a bill borne of a sensational, 
albeit tragic, event. Nevertheless, AB 1286 cautions against unbridled 
optimism for legislative change. 
California has traditionally had a strong interest in protecting the 
client and the lawyer-client relationship. AB 1286's failure to leave the 
committee demonstrates this. Moreover, it points out that anyone who 
seeks to tinker with the duty of confidentiality or the attorney-client 
privilege in California will likely face stiff opposition. Even Assembly 
Member Strickland recognized this just prior to introducing the bill: 
230. See Assemb. B. 1286, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999-2000) (as amended 
Apr. 26, 1999). 
231. See Assemb. B. 1286 (Cal. 1999-2000) (as amended Jan. 3, 2000) (proposing 
to add section 964 to the California Evidence Code). 
232. Id. 
233. See Complete Bill History: Bill Number: A.B. No. 1286, available at 
http:/lwww .leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/asm/ab_l 251-1300/ab_l286_bill_20000203_ 
history.html Oast visited Jan. 26, 2002). 
234. The bill grew out of a case involving the abduction of a fourteen-year-old girl 
whose body was not found for nearly a week after her disappearance. See Pamela J. 
Johnson, Manley Case Prompts Bill Proposal, L.A. TIMES (Ventura County), Mar. 9, 
1999, at Bl. A suspect led authorities to her body. It was discovered that the suspect's 
lawyer had probably known that his client had information about the location of the body 
even as the lawyer negotiated with prosecutors. Id. Although the victim was dead at the 
time the lawyer was negotiating, one of the aims of the bill was to address situations 
where a missing person might still be alive and threatened with death if not found. 
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"[a]ny time you want to touch this area-the attorney-client privilege-
you are certainly going to have to put up a fight."235 
Whether the same fate would face an attempt to amend or otherwise 
modify Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) cannot be 
foreseen. There are vested interests in California that would like to 
preserve the current confidentiality framework. Section 6068(e) is a 
venerable statutory provision that has remained unchanged for nearly 
130 years. Any attempt to carve out an exception to the duty in the 
legislature will have to confront this reality.236 To gain passage of any 
exception will require deft lobbying by its proponents. Nevertheless, 
the recent approval of a broader exception than most states currently 
have by the Ethics 2000 Commission places section 6068(e)'s absolute 
prohibition on disclosure in even starker contrast than in the past. 
California stands alone, and, given the strong policies underlying a 
life-threatening criminal activity exception, a bill seeking to modify 
section 6068( e) along the lines suggested in this Article might gamer 
sufficient support to be passed.237 There may, however, be other means 
to accomplish the same thing. These are discussed in the following 
sections. 
B. Providing an Exception by a Rule of Professional Conduct: The 
History and Significance of Proposed California Rule 3-100, 
the Lessons It Has Taught, and a Possible 
Rule-Making Strategy 
Another possibility for implementing a life-threatening criminal 
activity exception to the duty of confidentiality would be for the 
California Supreme Court to adopt a rule of professional conduct. 
Carving out an exception by rule, however, is not a novel concept. 
Indeed, that approach has a storied history in California. Since 1987, the 
California State Bar has attempted on several occasions to create 
exceptions to the duty by proposing that the supreme court adopt a rule 
of professional conduct, Rule 3-100. In the dozen or so years that Rule 
235. Id. Assembly Member Strickland did not misuse the term "attorney-client 
privilege." When the bill was introduced, it proposed to make an exception to the 
attorney-client privilege. As to the "fight" Assembly Bill 1286 encountered, the 
only listed opposition to the bill was California Attorneys for Criminal Justice. 
Hearing Before the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. Jan. l l, 2000), at 7, at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/asm/ab_1251-
I300/ab 1286 cfa 200001 l I 075754 asm comm.html. That does not mean, however, 
that there were not other opponents of the bill who may have been working behind the 
scenes to defeat the bill. 
236. So too would an attempt to create an exception by rule of professional conduct. 
237. See supra Part IV (discussing the character and scope an exception should take). 
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3-100 has been on the table, at least five different versions of it have 
been released for public comment.238 The California State Bar withdrew 
two of these before submitting them to the supreme court for approval. 
The supreme court rejected the other three, the two most recent 
rejections being made without comment. 
A consideration of Rule 3-lO0's history is instructive. What becomes 
apparent is that California's unique regulatory framework,239 regulation 
of lawyers by both legislatively enacted statutes and court-adopted rules, 
has presented obstacles to rule adoption that are not present in other 
jurisdictions. 
1. The History of Rule 3-100: A Doomed Rule? 
The initial incarnation of Rule 3-100, submitted to the court in 1987, 
included five sep·arate express exceptions to the duty, including an 
exception for life-threatening criminal activity.240 The court rejected 
238. For a comprehensive summary of the history of proposed Rule 3-100, see 
STATE BAR OF CAL. OFFICEOFPROF'LCOMPETENCE, PLANNING & DEV., supra note 83. 
239. See supra Part ID.A. 
240. The rule proposed in 1987 provided in its entirety: 
Rule 3-100. Duty to Maintain Client Confidence and Secrets Inviolate. 
(A) It is the duty of a member to maintain inviolate the confidence, and, at 
every peril to himself or herself, to preserve the secrets of a client or 
former client. 
(B) Definitions. 
(1) As used in this rule, "confidence" means information as defined in 
Evidence Code section 952. 
(2) As used in this rule, "secrets" means any information obtained by the 
member during the professional relationship, or relating to the 
representation, which the client has requested to be inviolate or the 
disclosure of which might be embarrassing or detrimental to the 
client. 
(C) A member may reveal a confidence or secret: 
(1) With the consent of the client; or 
(2) Upon the lawful order of a tribunal and after the member has 
asserted all relevant privileges of the client or former client and has 
given the earliest reasonable notice of such order to the client or 
former client to permit him or her to protect such confidence or 
secret; or 
(3) To the extent the member reasonably believes necessary: 
(a) to prevent the commission of a criminal act that the member 
believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm; or 
(b) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of a member in a 
controversy between the member and the client, to establish a 
defense to a disciplinary or criminal charge or civil claim 
against the member based upon conduct in which the client was 
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that proposal, apparently taking the position that it did not have 
authority to adopt the rule.241 
Subsequent proposals for exceptions to the duty of confidentiality 
were narrower in breadth, but they had in common an exception to allow 
lawyers to disclose confidential information if their clients intended to 
engage in life-threatening criminal activity. However, those proposals 
fared no better than the 1987 proposal. 
The proposed Rule 3-100 submitted to the supreme court in 1992 
was limited to exceptions applicable when the client consents and 
when life-threatening criminal activity by the client is present.242 The 
involved, or to respond in any proceeding to allegations by a 
client of incompetent representation in a criminal matter. 
(D) Except where disclosure is otherwise permitted by this rule, a 
member shall not: 
(1) Use a confidence or secret of a client or former client to the 
disadvantage of the client; or 
(2) Use a confidence or secret of a client for the advantage of the 
member or of a third person, provided that member may make 
use of work product, if that is done without disclosing the 
client's identity or the nature of the professional engagement for 
the client. 
When a member comes to know beyond a reasonable doubt 
that material evidence offered to a tribunal by the member on 
behalf of a client is false, the member shall confidentially 
exhort the client to permit the correction of the false evidence. 
If the client refuses to permit such correction, the member shall 
withdraw from further representation of the client before the 
tribunal if permissible under rule 3-700. If such withdrawal is 
not possible, the member shall not further the deception, subject 
to the duty in this rule to protect the client's confidence and 
secrets. 
See STATE BAR OF CAL. OFACE OF PROF'L COMPETENCE, PLANNING & DEV., supra note 
83, at enclosure 4. 
241. The court, in a letter to then State Bar President Terry Anderlini, suggested 
that if the rule was intended to permit disclosure in a proceeding where the attorney-
client evidentiary privilege attached, the supreme court might not have the authority to 
approve such a rule. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; infra notes 251-67 and 
accompanying text (discussing the import of this letter). 
242. The 1992 proposal provided: 
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Rule 3-100. Duty to Maintain Client Confidence and Secrets Inviolate. 
(A) It is the duty of a member to maintain inviolate the confidence, and, 
at every peril to himself or herself, to preserve the secrets of a client. 
(B) Definitions. 
(1) As used in this rule, "confidence" means information as 
defined in Evidence Code section 952. 
(2) As used in this rule, "secrets" means any information obtained 
by the member during the professional relationship, or relating 
to the representation, which the client has requested to be 
inviolate or the disclosure of which might be embarrassing or 
detrimental to the client. 
(C) A member is not subject to discipline who reveals a confidence or 
secret: 
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drafters of the 1992 proposal took a different approach to providing an 
exception to the duty of confidentiality. In 1987, the proposed rule 
was written as an express exception to the duty of confidentiality, that 
is, it stated that a lawyer "may reveal a confidence or secret."243 In 
essence, the 1987 version stated that, notwithstanding section 
6068(e)'s prohibitions on disclosure of confidential information, a 
lawyer "may" disclose under the stated circumstances.244 Such an 
approach runs directly counter to the express language of the 
legislatively enacted section 6068(e) and could have been viewed as a 
frontal attack on a legislative prerogative. 
The 1992 proposed rule, on the other hand, was drafted to provide a 
safe harbor for the disclosing lawyer. It stated that a lawyer "is not 
subject to discipline who reveals a confidence or secret."245 A rule 
phrased in that way would not have directly contravened the language 
of section 6068(e). Instead, it would have been an unambiguous 
statement by the State Bar of California that, under the narrow 
circumstances identified in the rule ( disclosures with client consent or 
where life-threatening criminal activity is present), it would not subject 
a lawyer to discipline. That this approach might be a distinction 
without a difference is suggested not only by the supreme court's 
rejection of the 1992 proposal, but also by the California State Bar in 
1998 abandoning the safe harbor strategy in favor of a rule taking the 
1987 approach-expressly permitting disclosures.246 The latter 
(1) With the consent of the client; or 
(2) To the extent the member reasonably believes necessary to 
prevent the commission of a criminal act that the member 
believes is imminently likely to result in death or substantial 
bodily harm. 
See STA1E BAR OF CAL. OFFICE OF PROF'L COMPE1ENCE, PLANNING & DEV., supra note 
83, at enclosure 9. 
243. Id. at enclosure 4. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. at enclosure 9. 
246. The 1998 proposal provided: 
Rule 3-100: Confidential Information Relating to Certain Criminal Acts. 
(A) A member may, but is not required to, reveal confidential information 
relating to the representation of a client to the extent that the member 
reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to prevent the client from 
committing a criminal act that the member believes is likely to result in 
death or substantial bodily harm. 
(B) For purposes of this rule, "confidential information" means information 
related to the representation of a client that: 
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approach fared no better than it had in 1987; the supreme court again 
rejected the proposed rule. 
2. The California Supreme Court's Concern: A Statutory Framework 
Impervious to Rulemaking 
Although we cannot know precisely why the California Supreme 
Court has rejected the Rule 3-100 proposals, its letter to then State Bar 
President Terry Anderlini in 1987 provides strong clues.247 In that letter, 
the court stated: "To the extent it [proposed Rule 3-100] permits 
disclosure in a judicial proceeding where no statutory exception to the 
privilege exists, it may be inconsistent with, or contravene the 
Legislature's intent underlying Evidence Code section 950 et seq."248 
This observation appears to show a court concerned that its adoption of a 
life-threatening crime exception to the duty of confidentiality would 
undermine the legislative framework created for the attorney-client 
privilege. That the court was unsure of its authority under these 
circumstances is reflected in the question it asked in closing: "Where the 
Legislature has codified, and revised, or supplanted privileges previously 
available at common law, does the court have inherent authority to 
modify this statutory privilege?"249 
To understand the court's concern, it is helpful to review the 
framework of the attorney-client privilege within the California 
Evidence Code. Evidence Code section 954 contains the basic statement 
of the attorney-client privilege.250 It provides, in pertinent part, that 
"except as otherwise provided in this Article, the client, whether or not a 
party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from 
disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer if 
the privilege is claimed by" the privilege holder,251 the privilege holder's 
(1) is subject to the lawyer-client privilege, or 
(2) has been acquired from any source, and 
(a) which the client has requested be held inviolate, or 
(b) the disclosure of which is likely to be embarrassing or 
detrimental to the client. 
Id., at enclosure 1. 
247. See id. at 10-11 (quoting Letter from the California Supreme Court, to Terri 
Anderlini, President, State Bar of California (June 9, 1998)). 
248. Id. 
249. Id. 
250. California Evidence Code section 954 remains largely unchanged since the 
supreme court wrote that letter. The only change since then was in 1994, when the section 
was amended to clarify that the word "person" as used in the section also includes "limited 
liability companies." S.B. 2053, 1993-1994 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 1994), available at 
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/93-94/bill/sen/sb_2051-21 OO/sb_2053_bill_9406 l 3_amended_asm. 
251. CAL. Evrn. CODE§ 954(a) (West 1995). California Evidence Code section 953 
defines the "holder of the privilege" to mean: 
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authorized representative,252 or "the person who was the lawyer at the 
time of the confidential communication."253 Thus, section 954 identifies 
who may claim the privilege and under what circumstances it may be 
claimed.254 
Moreover, section 955 of the Evidence Code provides that any lawyer 
who has "received or made a communication subject to the privilege" 
must claim the privilege "whenever he is present when the 
communication is sought to be disclosed" and the lawyer "is authorized 
to claim the privilege."255 Put another way, section 955 sets forth when a 
lawyer must claim the privilege.256 Together with section 954, which 
(a) The client when he has no guardian or conservator. 
(b) A guardian or conservator of the client when the client has a guardian 
or conservator. 
(c)The personal representative of the client if the client is dead. 
(d) A successor, assign, trustee in dissolution, or any similar representative 
of a finn, association, organization, partnership, business trust, corporation, or 
public entity that is no longer in existence. 
Id.§ 953 (emphasis added). 
252. Id. § 954(b ). 
253. Id.§ 954(c). 
254. Other sections of the Evidence Code offer "lawyer" definitions. "Lawyer" is 
defined as: "a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized, to 
practice law in any state or nation." Id. § 950. "Client" is defined as: 
a person who, directly or through an authorized representative, consults a 
lawyer for the purpose of retaining the lawyer or securing legal service or 
advice from him in his professional capacity, and includes an incompetent (a) 
who himself so consults the lawyer or (b) whose guardian or conservator so 
consults the lawyer in behalf of the incompetent. 
Id. § 951. "A confidential communication between client and lawyer'' means: 
[l]nfonnation transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer in the course 
of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the client is 
aware, discloses the infonnation to no third persons other than those who are 
present to further the interest of the client in the consultation or those to whom 
disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the infonnation or 
the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted, and 
includes a legal opinion fanned and the advice given by the lawyer in the 
course of that relationship. 
Id.§ 952. 
255. In its entirety, section 955 provides: "The lawyer who received or made a 
communication subject to the privilege under this article shall claim the privilege 
whenever he is present when the communication is sought to be disclosed and is 
authorized to claim the privilege under subdivision (c) of Section 954." Id. § 955 
(emphasis added). 
256. Section 955 creates for California lawyers a duty to claim the privilege 
whenever a person seeks to compel disclosure. Compare section 954, which sets out the 
circumstances under which the privilege may be claimed-when disclosure is sought to 
be compelled. Id. § 954. Because section 954 is "[s]ubject to Section 912," the provision 
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sets out the circumstances under which the privilege may be claimed and 
by whom, section 955 requires a lawyer to assert the privilege whenever 
some person seeks to compel disclosure of a communication subject to 
the privilege. 
The privilege, however, is not absolute. Sections 956 through 962 of 
the Evidence Code remove the evidentiary protection of the privilege 
under certain circumstances.257 Thus, the attorney-client privilege set 
out in section 954, and the corresponding lawyer's duty to assert it under 
section 955, are not triggered if one of the exceptions contained in 
sections 956 through 962 is applicable. If an exception to the privilege 
exists, a lawyer can be compelled to disclose the client's "confidential 
communication."258 Conversely, if there is no exception, then the lawyer 
has a duty to assert the privilege pursuant to Evidence Code section 955. 
Keeping in mind the foregoing framework that requires a lawyer to 
assert the privilege unless there is an exception, the court's 
preoccupation with the privilege in the context of the California State 
Bar's proposal to revise the lawyer's duty of confidentiality is evident. 
In 1988 when the court wrote President Anderlini, there was no 
exception to the attorney-client privilege allowing a lawyer to disclose a 
client's life-threatening criminal activity. The legislature did not enact 
section 956.5 of the Evidence Code until September 17, 1993. 259 
Without that exception, a lawyer could not, consistent with her duty 
under Evidence Code section 955 that mandates assertion of the 
privilege, disclose information otherwise protected by the privilege, 
including a client's life-threatening criminal activity. Thus, the supreme 
court in 1988 was faced with the following dilemma: if it were to carve 
out a life-threatening criminal activity exception to the duty of 
confidentiality (which includes within its scope attorney-client 
that addresses waiver of the privilege, it also recognizes that a client may waive the 
privilege. Id. Section 912 provides that the privilege is waived "if any holder of the 
privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has 
consented to such disclosure made by anyone." Id. § 912. 
257. Sections 956 through 962 all begin by stating, "There is no privilege" and then 
proceed to describe the conditions under which the privilege is deemed not to apply. 
See id. §§ 956-962. For example, section 956 provides that "There is no privilege under 
this article if the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone 
to commit or plan to commit a crime or a fraud." Id. § 956. 
258. See section 952 for the definition of "confidential communication." See id. 
§ 952; supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
259. Section 956.5 was enrolled on September 17, 1993, signed by the Governor on 
October 9, 1993, and chaptered by the Secretary of State on October 11, 1993. It became 
effective on January 1, 1994. See Complete Bill History: Bill Number: S.B. No. 645, 
available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/93-94/bill/sen/sb_060 l-0650/sb_645_bil I_ 
history (last visited May 18, 2002). Links to other related documents are available at 
http://info.sen.ca.gov/c't!).-bin/postquery?bill_number=sb_645&sess=9394&house=B&site=sen 
(last visited May 18, 2002). 
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privileged matter)260 and the statutory attorney-client privilege did not 
contain a corresponding exception, the court would have interfered with 
the framework reflecting the legislature's intent in codifying the 
attorney-client privilege. 
That is why the court suggested that "[t]o the extent [an exception to 
the duty of confidentiality] permits disclosure in a judicial proceeding 
where no statutory exception to the privilege exists, it may be 
inconsistent with, or contravene the Legislature's intent underlying 
Evidence Code section 950 et seq."261 The effect of a rule allowing 
disclosure would effectively run at counter-purposes to the then absolute 
duty to assert the privilege under section 955. Given that a privilege can 
be created, and presumably modified, only by statute,262 the court 
understandably questioned whether it had the authority to modify the 
duty of confidentiality.263 
If the foregoing interpretation of the 1988 version of Rule 3-100 and 
the supreme court's rejection is accurate, then the California Supreme 
Court should not be averse to modifying the duty of confidentiality to 
include an express exception so long as there is a corresponding 
exception to the attorney-client privilege. As section 956.5 now 
provides a life-threatening criminal activity exception to the attorney 
client privilege, one would think the court should welcome the 
opportunity to adopt a rule that provides such an exception. 
There are problems with this analysis, however, not the least of which 
are the court's rejections of a proposed Rule 3-100 in 1993 and 1998.264 
Although the 1993 rejection possibly can be explained by the legislature 
not yet having enacted section 956.5, it is more difficult to square the 
foregoing analysis with the 1998 rejection. 
First, in June 1993, when the supreme court rejected without comment 
the proposed rule, the legislature was considering an amendment to the 
Evidence Code to create an exception for life-threatening criminal 
activity. The bill containing language that is now codified at section 
956.5 was not passed until September 17, 1993, so it is possible that the 
260. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
261. STAIB BAR OF CAL. OFFICE OF PROF'L COMPETENCE, PLANNING & DEV., supra 
note 83, at 10-11. 
262. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 911 (West 1995) (''Except as otherwise provided by 
statute .... "); see also supra note 107. 
263. See discussion supra note 104; sources cited supra note 104; supra note 107. 
264. See id. at 12-14; see also Nancy McCarthy, Court Rejects Rule to Bare 
Secrets, CAL. BARJ., Oct. 1998, at 4. 
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court's rejection of Rule 3-100 in 1993 was for the same reasons posited 
above for its 1988 rejection. However, is it really conceivable that the 
court was unaware that section 956.5 was under consideration?265 
Assuming the court was aware of the pending bill containing new 
section 956.5, and further, assuming that the reason the court rejected the 
1987 proposal was the absence of a bodily harm exception to the lawyer-
client privilege, why would it not have awaited final legislative 
resolution of the bill? With a privilege exception in place, the objections 
it stated in 1988 should have been assuaged. 
Second, and even more telling, is the supreme court's rejection in 
1998 of yet another version of proposed Rule 3-100.266 There would 
have been no question then whether the court was aware of the 
disconnect between Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) and 
Evidence Code section 956.5. Indeed, it was that very inconsistency that 
motivated the California State Bar to again submit a proposed Rule 3-
100. The California State Bar announced that its express purpose in 
submitting another Rule 3-100 was to harmonize Business and 
Professions Code section 6068(e) with Evidence Code section 956.5.267 
Therefore, the court was abundantly aware not only of the existence of 
Evidence Code section 956.5, but also of the inconsistency between it 
and Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). Nevertheless, the 
court rejected the proposed rule.268 
The mostly likely explanations for what we see in the court's rejection 
of Rule 3-100 is either antipathy on the part of the court to 
265. As already discussed, the bill that contained then-proposed section 956.5 was 
introduced on March 2, 1993, so it would have been pending as the court considered the 
1993 proposal. See discussion supra note 91. 
266. See McCarthy, supra note 264, at 4. 
267. In its May 1998 submission to the supreme court, the state bar stated: 
The intent of proposed new rule 3-100 is to accomplish the limited goal of 
harmonizing the ethical duty of confidentiality stated in Business and 
Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e), with the statutory exception to 
the lawyer-client privilege stated in Evidence Code section 956.5. Evidence 
Code section 956.5, which became operative on January 1, 1994, creates an 
exception to the lawyer-client privilege .... 
The enactment of section 956.5 has caused concern among members of 
the bar because it creates uncertainty regarding the relationship between it and 
the ethical duty to maintain a client's confidence and secrets under Business 
and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e), which states that it is a 
duty of an attorney to "maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to 
himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client." While there are 
numerous statutory exceptions to the lawyer-client privilege found in Evidence 
Code section 950 et seq., there are no statutory exceptions to the ethical duty 
found in Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e). 
STA TE BAR OF CAL. OFFICE OF PROF'L COMPETENCE, PLANNING & DEV., supra note 83, at 2. 
268. But see infra notes 277-85 and accompanying text. 
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confidentiality exceptions, or simply its reluctance to invade a statutory 
framework. Of course, it is always possible that the court believed it had 
already addressed the issue in General Dynamics by reference to 
Evidence Code section 956.5 in the context of a retaliatory discharge 
suit,269 and was sending a signal that the members of the bar should 
recognize that.270 There is yet another possible explanation to be drawn 
from Rule 3-lO0's notorious history, discussed below, but before 
addressing that, it is worth considering a recent California Supreme 
Court opinion that demonstrates the court's reluctance to invade a 
legislatively enacted statutory scheme. 
3. Further Evidence of the Court's Reluctance to Invade a Statutory 
Framework: Foxgate Homeowners Ass'n v. Bramalea California, Inc. 
A further hint that the supreme court may not welcome any further 
proposals to modify the duty of confidentiality by rule can be found in 
one of its recent opinions, Foxgate Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Bramalea 
California, Inc.,271 where the court invalidated a judicially created 
exception to a statutory scheme that the legislature had enacted to 
encourage mediation. Foxgate involved a mediation held pursuant to 
statutes designed to ensure the confidentiality of mediations.272 The 
269. See supra notes 115-51 and accompanying text 
270. It is always possible, however, that this Article's surmises about section 956.5, 
General Dynamics, and the duty of confidentiality are simply misguided and that the 
court believes it has plainly addressed the issues raised in this Article already. This is 
reminiscent of the scene from Woody Allen's film, "Annie Hall," where Mr. Allen's 
character, Alvy Singer, is waiting in line to see a film, listening with increasing irritation 
to the person in front of him who is pontificating to his date about Marshal McLuhan. 
Finally, Alvy can take no more and tells the man (who has informed Allen that he 
teaches a course on McLuhan at Columbia University) that he does not know anything 
about McLuhan. Alvy then brings McLuhan out from behind a standing movie poster. 
McLuhan, in bowler hat, tells the man: "I heard what you were saying. You know 
nothing of my work. You mean my whole fallacy is wrong. How you ever got to teach a 
course in anything is totally amazing." ANNIE HALL (MGM Home Entm't 1977). The 
Author, like all law professors who attempt to parse what they believe is an ambiguous 
opinion, fears such a "McLuhan moment." 
271. 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001). 
272. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 703.5, 1121, 1119 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002). For 
example, section 703.5 provides in pertinent part: 
No person presiding at any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, and no 
arbitrator or mediator, shall be competent to testify, in any subsequent civil 
proceeding, as to any statement, conduct, decision, or ruling, occurring at or in 
conjunction with the prior proceeding, except as to a statement or conduct that 
could (a) give rise to civil or criminal contempt, (b) constitute a crime, (c) be 
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mediator submitted a report to the superior court that included 
statements made during the mediation. The statements in turn became 
the basis for the superior court's imposition of sanctions against the 
appellants. In affirming, the court of appeal created a narrow, 
nonstatutory exception to the statutes' confidentiality requirements that 
would permit "a mediator to report to a court only information that is 
reasonably necessary to describe sanctionable conduct and place that 
conduct in context."273 
The supreme court granted review and reversed. It first noted that 
"[t]o carry out the purpose of encouraging mediation by ensuring 
confidentiality, the statutory scheme, which includes sections 703.5, 
1119, and 1121, unqualifiedly bars disclosure of communications made 
during mediation absent an express statutory exception."274 The court 
then stated: 
[W]e do not agree with the Court of Appeal that the court may fashion an 
exception for bad faith in mediation because failure to authorize reporting of 
such conduct during mediation may lead to "an absurd result" or fail to carry 
out the legislative policy of encouraging mediation. The Legislature has 
decided that the policy of encouraging mediation by ensuring confidentiality is 
promoted by avoiding the threat that frank expression of viewpoints by the 
parties during mediation may subject a participant to a motion for imposition of 
sanctions by another party or the mediator who might assert that those views 
constitute a bad faith failure to participate in mediation. Therefore, even were 
the court free to ignore the plain language of the confidentiality statutes, there is 
no justification for doing so here.275 
The court's language in Foxgate demonstrates a decided reluctance on 
its part to interpose itself into a statutory scheme, at least through the 
device of a judicially created exception. The same view has probably 
informed its repeated rejections of Rule 3-100. Those rejections 
the subject of investigation by the State Bar or Commission on Judicial 
Performance, or (d) give rise to disqualification proceedings .... 
Id.§ 703.5. 
Section 1121 provides: 
Neither a mediator nor anyone else may submit to a court or other adjudicative 
body, and a court or other adjudicative body may not consider, any report, 
assessment, evaluation, recommendation, or finding of any kind by the 
mediator concerning a mediation conducted by the mediator, other than a 
report that is mandated by court rule or other law and that states only whether 
an agreement was reached, unless all parties to the mediation expressly agree 
otherwise in writing, or orally in accordance with Section 1118. 
Id. § 1121. 
Finally, section I 119(c) provides: "All communications, negotiations, or settlement 
discussions by and between participants in the course of a mediation or a mediation 
consultation shall remain confidential." Id.§ I I 19(c) (emphasis added). 
273. Foxgate Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 25 P.3d at 1123. 
274. Id. at 1126. 
275. Id. at 1128. 
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probably do not reflect a deep-seated antipathy, alluded to earlier, on the 
court's part to exceptions to the duty of confidentiality. Rather, they 
more likely evince the court's belief that it does not have the authority to 
upend the absolute language of Business and Professions Code section 
6068( e ), notwithstanding the existence of 956.5. 276 In short, California's 
unique regulatory framework comprised of both statutes and 
professional conduct rules has probably done more than anything else to 
forestall the adoption in California of a life-threatening criminal activity 
exception. 
276. In 1998, the California Supreme Court decided a case that has surface appeal 
for supporting the proposition that under its inherent authority to regulate the legal 
profession, the court can adopt a rule that runs counter to section 6068(e). In that case, 
In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d 49, 54 (Cal. 1998), the court held that it had 
inherent authority over the discipline of lawyers, and that it could impose fees on 
lawyers without invading either the legislature's taxation power or its appropriation 
power, or violating the separation or powers clause of the California Constitution. That 
case, however, was decided under extenuating circumstances-a bar disciplinary system 
choked with a backlog of client complaints against lawyers due to then Governor Wilson's 
refusal to approve the bill the legislature had passed authorizing the state bar to collect dues 
from its members during 1998 and 1999. Nancy McCarthy, Supreme Court Orders $173 
Fee: Unprecedented, Unanimous Ruling Enables Bar to Begin Rebuilding Discipline 
System, CAL B.J., Jan. 1999, at 1, http://www.ca1bar.cagov/calbar/2cbj/99jan/index.htm. 
The court resolved that impasse, but in doing so it stressed the pressing public need to take 
the action that it did. In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d at 68-70. It also cannot be 
stressed enough that the court was operating in a vacuum. There was no statute enabling 
the bar to collect dues; the court acted to fill a void created by the governor's refusal to sign 
the fees bill. Indeed, in rejecting the governor's argument that the court could use the 
"resources" of the bar but not its "structure" in implementing a disciplinary system under 
the court's direct control, the court stated: 
In our view, it would be far more intrusive for the court to exert authority over 
resources that the bar has available to it under previous legislative 
authorization that dedicates these resources to purposes other than discipline, 
than to impose additional fees to support the existing disciplinary system .... 
Tampering with the existing resources collected and allocated to the bar 
pursuant to valid existing legislation, particularly funds designated for uses 
other than discipline, would not be deferential to the Legislature's traditional 
and continuing role in this area. 
Id. at 71. Notwithstanding its continued acknowledgement that it has inherent authority 
to regulate the legal profession, the court's recognition that it was acting to fill a void 
created by the inaction of the legislative and executive branches suggests that the court 
would not reverse its previously stated concerns about its authority to change a 
legislative enactment. Id. at 54. Thus, In re Attorney Discipline System probably does 
not support the proposition that the court may now act to approve a rule of professional 
conduct creating an exception to the statutory duty of confidentiality. But see infra notes 
277-85 and accompanying text (suggesting that the court's inherent authority to 
discipline lawyers may allow it to provide lawyers a safe harbor from discipline). 
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4. A Safe Harbor Rule: A Small Window of Opportunity or a 
Stubborn Refusal to Give Up? 
Nevertheless, there may yet be a small window of opportunity for the 
court, without trespassing on the legislature's domain, to promulgate a 
rule that would signal to lawyers that they may disclose confidential 
information where life-threatening criminal conduct by their clients 
exists. As discussed previously, in 1993, the bar submitted a "safe 
harbor" approach for the court's approval.277 Under that strategy, it 
could be argued that the court would not invade the legislature's power; 
rather, the rule would simply be a statement that under the narrow 
circumstances identified in the rule ( disclosure where life-threatening 
criminal activity is present), the bar would not prosecute the lawyer. 
As already noted, the history of Rule 3-100 suggests this might be a 
distinction without a difference, as the 1993 proposal was rejected.278 
When the supreme court rejected the 1993 proposal, however, section 
956.5, which would have assuaged the concerns the court expressed in 
1987, had not yet been enacted. Further, recall that in 1998, with section 
956.5 then in effect, the bar abandoned its safe harbor strategy and 
returned to a rule that provided an express exception to section 6068(e). 
It is possible, then, that the 1998 proposal owes its rebuff to the bar's 
decision to make a "frontal assault" on section 6068(e). Had the bar 
pursued a strategy proposing the safe harbor rule in concert with section 
956.5, the court may well have adopted the rule.279 
But why would a safe harbor rule stating that the disclosing lawyer 
will not be subject to discipline be different from a rule expressly stating 
that the lawyer could disclose in contravention of section 6068(e)? Are 
the two approaches not in effect the same: both result in the disclosing 
lawyer not being disciplined? Perhaps the answer to this question lies in 
the court's acknowledgement in In re Attorney Discipline System of its 
well-established, inherent authority over the discipline of California 
lawyers.280 While the two approaches may have the same effect, the 
277. See supra notes 242-50 and accompanying text. The rule would state: "A 
lawyer is not subject to discipline who reveals a confidence or secret to the extent the 
member reasonably believes necessary to prevent the commission of a criminal act that 
the member believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm," or something 
to that effect. 
278. See supra notes 242-50 and accompanying text. 
279. There is, of course, the possibility that when the court rejected the 1993 safe 
harbor proposal, it was because it expected Evidence Code section 956.5 to be enacted. 
The court could have believed that section 956.5 would apply with equal force to both 
the attorney-client privilege and Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). If that 
were the case, it would have seen no purpose at all in a Rule 3-100. See discussion supra 
note 270. 
280. In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d at 54. 
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direct approach invades the legislature's authority to amend section 
6068(e). The safe harbor approach, on the other hand, preserves the 
integrity of section 6068(e)'s language, but gives notice to lawyers that, 
notwithstanding section 6068( e )' s absolute prohibition on disclosures, 
under certain circumstances public policy considerations militate against 
the imposition of discipline. Under this approach, the language of 
section 6068(e) would continue to put lawyers on notice of their critical 
duty to preserve their client's confidential information. Moreover, 
lawyers who disclose still would have to satisfy stiff requirements-their 
reasonable belief that disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act 
that will result in death or serious bodily harm-to escape discipline. 
However, lawyers would no longer be subject to the uncertainty 
generated by the "logical disconnect" between Evidence Code section 
956.6 and Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) when 
confronted with life-threatening criminal activity. They would be able 
to make the difficult decision about whether to disclose without having 
bar discipline hanging over their heads.281 
281. The approach espoused in this Section should be reminiscent of the position 
the Los Angeles County Bar took in its Formal Opinion 436, that is, that policy 
considerations underlying the bodily harm exception should permit an implied exception 
to section 6068(e). The difference here is that protection from discipline for the 
disclosing lawyer need no longer be implied and consequently, need no longer be 
uncertain. Moreover, a rule of professional conduct carries with it the authority lacking 
in a local bar opinion. See CAL. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 1-100 (2000). 
The advantages of a rule that provides unambiguous guidance to lawyers can be seen 
in the Ossias-Quackenbush Insurance Department matter that played out in California in 
late spring and summer of 2000. Chuck Quackenbush, California's Insurance 
Commissioner, improperly settled cases against insurance companies and used the 
proceeds of the settlement to fund television commercials in which he starred. A lawyer 
in the department, Cindy Ossias, frustrated by Mr. Quackenbush's conduct, eventually 
provided the Assembly's Insurance Committee with documentation of the 
Commissioner's misconduct. She was put on immediate administrative leave by the 
department, but after Mr. Quackenbush resigned, she was reinstated. Her troubles did 
not end there. She became the subject of a state bar investigation. Virginia Ellis & Carl 
Ingram, Whistle-Blower Emerges in Quackenbush Probe, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 2000, at 
Al; Virginia Ellis & Miguel Bustillo, Quackenbush Hearings Take Dramatic Turn, L.A. 
TIMES, June 27, 2000, at Al; Virginia Ellis & Carl Ingram, Quackenbush Resigns; Probe 
Will Continue, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at Al; Virginia Ellis, State Insurance Dept. 
Reinstates Whistle-Blower, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2000, at A33. Eventually, the state bar 
closed its investigation. Letter from Donald R. Steedman, Deputy Trial Counsel, State 
Bar of California, to Richard A. Zitrin, Counsel for Cindy Ossias (Oct. 11, 2000), in 
DAILY RECORDER, Dec. 13, 2000, at 7. However, Ossias had no guidance on how to 
proceed. Had she had proper guidance, perhaps in the form of a rule that spelled out for 
her what her options were when confronted by a situation where it is the head of the 
governmental agency who is acting improperly, she and the state bar may have avoided 
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C. Strategies Involving Coordination Between the Supreme Court, the 
State Bar, and the Legislature 
There are two other strategies for implementing a bodily harm 
exception. They both would involve coordination between the bar, the 
supreme court, and the legislature. 
I. Parallel Regulation by Statute and Rule 
First, the legislature and the court could coordinate the amendment 
of Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) to include the bodily 
harm exception with the promulgation of a rule of professional conduct 
that mirrors the amended statute. There is precedent for such parallel 
regulation. For example, both Business and Professions Code section 
6068(m) and Rule 3-500 require that a lawyer notify his or her client of 
significant developments that arise during the representation.282 Requiring 
a lawyer to notify the client of significant developments and promptly 
complying with reasonable requests for information and significant 
documents is not, however, either a very controversial issue or one that 
involves the balancing of competing public policies that underlie 
exceptions to the core duty of confidentiality. 
Any rule involving the duty of confidentiality is much more 
the time, expense, and emotional drain of a formal investigation. 
Eventually, her experience led to the introduction of Assembly Bill 363. See Assemb. B. 
363, 2001 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_035l-
0400/ab_363_bill_ 20010220_introduced.html. Consideration of Assembly Bill 363 was 
suspended while the State Bar of California reviewed and addressed the issue. For a 
history of Assembly Bill 363, see Complete Bill History, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/ 
bill/asm/ab_0351-0400/ab_363_bi11_200l0822_history.html (last visited May 21, 2002). The 
state bar's review, in cooperation with parties interested in the issue, resulted in 
proposed revisions to Rule 3-600. STATE BAR OF CAL., REQUEST THAT THE SUPREME 
COURT OF CALIFORNIA APPROVE AMENDMENTS TO RULE 3-600 OF THE RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, AND MEMORANDUM 
AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS IN EXPLANATION (2002), available at http://www.calbar. 
ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/rule3-600request.pdf. See also infra note 291. 
282. California Business and Professions Code section 6068(m) provides that the 
attorney's duty is: "To respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries of clients and to 
keep clients reasonably informed of significant developments in matters with regard to 
which the attorney has agreed to provide legal services." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 
6068(m) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002). 
Cal. Rule 3-500, provides: "A member shall keep a client reasonably informed about 
significant developments relating to the employment or representation, including 
promptly complying with reasonable requests for information and copies of significant 
documents when necessary to keep the client so informed." CAL. RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 3-500. 
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controversial, and the likelihood of reaching a consensus among the bar, 
the court, and the legislature on the scope, or even the efficacy, of the 
rule would not be great.283 Moreover, even if the rule proved amenable 
to consensus on the issue of life-threatening criminal activity, there may 
be other exceptions to the duty that are warranted that may not be as 
susceptible to achieving consensus. This consideration leads to a 
proposal that will no doubt be viewed as controversial in itself: transfer 
the duty of confidentiality from Business and Professions Code section 
6068( e) to a rule of professional conduct. 
2. Transferring the Duty of Confidentiality to a Rule of 
Professional Conduct 
A second proposal that would involve coordination among the court, 
the legislature, and the bar is for the legislature to repeal Business and 
Professions Code section 6068(e), effective upon the supreme court 
adopting a rule of professional conduct that parallels section 6068(e). 
This is a controversial proposal if for no other reason than it would put 
the duty of confidentiality out of the house, where it has resided (both 
literally and figuratively) for nearly 130 years. 
As can be seen from the previous discussion regarding the 
introduction and expiration of AB 1286,284 the legislature may be more 
susceptible than the court to political pressures brought on by sensational 
events. Indeed, even where proposed amendments to the duty are 
compelling, the legislature is probably more susceptible than the court to 
the pressures of various interested parties, and the compromises that 
likely would ensue might weaken the proposed legislation. Given the 
centrality of the duty of confidentiality to the attorney-client relationship 
and by extension, our legal system, the compromises that are the life-
blood of legislation might ultimately prove fatal. 
This is not to say that the court is immune to political pressures. 
However, free from term limits and being subject to elections only once 
every twelve years, the court is probably less susceptible to such 
pressures than the legislature. In addition, the public comment review 
period for proposed rules is well-designed to garner opinion from the 
public and the various sectors within the bar. Both the California State 
Bar and the court are sensitive to the concerns of their constituents, and 
283. See supra notes 228-39 and accompanying text 
284. See supra notes 228-39 and accompanying text. 
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there are numerous instances where public comment has resulted in 
substantial revisions of, or even withdrawal of the proposed rule. 285 
Moreover, the court has demonstrated a marked inclination to protect the 
interests of the client and preserve the attorney-client relationship, two 
of the policy objectives of the duty of confidentiality.286 It would not be 
quick to engage in wholesale modifications to this most central of a 
lawyer's duties. 
A further consideration favoring the transfer of the duty to a rule of 
professional conduct is the California State Bar's Commission for the 
Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Commission). The 
Commission has been charged by the state bar with reviewing the 
current California Rules in light of the revisions to the Model Rules 
proposed by the Ethics 2000 Commission.287 The Commission will thus 
285. Consider, for example, the history of Rule 3-100. In addition, recent rule 
proposals have been withdrawn after being sent out for public comments. See, e.g., State 
Bar of Cal., Member/Public Comment: Proposed Amendment to Rule 3-310, available at 
http://www.calbar.org/2bar/3com/3cp9805.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2002) (addressing 
conflict of interest); State Bar of Cal, Member/Public Comment: Proposed New Rule 4-
110, available at http://www.calbar.org/2bar/3com/3cpro22a.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 
2002) (addressing issue of advanced fees). 
286. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 503 (Cal. 
1994) ("We emphasize the limited scope of our conclusion that in-house counsel may 
state a cause of action in tort for retaliatory discharge. The lawyer's high duty of fidelity 
to the interests of the client work against a tort remedy that is coextensive with that 
available to the nonattorney employee."); id. at 503-04 ("In any event, where the 
elements of a wrongful discharge in violation of a fundamental public policy claim 
cannot, for reasons peculiar to the particular case, be fully established without breaching 
the attorney-client privilege, the suit must be dismissed in the interest of preserving the 
privilege."); see also Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950, 951 (Cal. 1994). 
287. The Commission's Charter states, inter alia, that: 
[T]he Commission is to consider, along with judicial and statutory 
developments, the Final Report and Recommendations of the American Bar 
Association's ("ABA") Ethics 2000 Commission and the American Law 
Institute's Restatement of the Law Third, The Law Governing Lawyers 
("Restatement"), as well as other authorities relevant to the development of 
professional responsibility standards. 
Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Commission 
Charter, at http://www.calbar.org/2eth/3crrpc/index.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2002). 
Related to the theme of this Article, it is of some interest to also note that: 
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Facilitate compliance with and enforcement of the rules by 
eliminating ambiguities and uncertainties in the rules; 
Assure adequate protection to the public in light of developments 
that have occurred since the rules were last reviewed and amended in 
1989 and 1992; 
Promote confidence in the legal profession and the administration of 
justice; and 
Eliminate and avoid unnecessary differences between California and 
other states, fostering the evolution of a national standard with 
respect to professional responsibility issues. 
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be well positioned to consider any proposed revisions to the duty of 
confidentiality and their interrelationship with any other proposed 
revisions that will be before it. 
Finally, it is important to remember that even if the duty of 
confidentiality is transferred to a rule of professional conduct, the 
legislature will not be relinquishing control in the area of 
confidentiality. The attorney-client privilege, which in California is a 
exclusively a legislative bailiwick,288 will still be within its sole 
purview. Moreover, the court's reluctance to adopt rule 3-100 absent 
an exception to _the privilege that paralleled the proposed rule,289 and its 
strong statements in General Dynamics that an in-house lawyer would 
be able to proceed with a retaliatory discharge claim only where there 
were "well-recognized exceptions to the attorney-client privilege,"290 
both demonstrate that the court will not blaze new trails in California's 
law of confidentiality without legislative input. 
This proposal would require cooperation among the legislature, the 
court, and the bar. Such cooperation is not unusual. Within the last 
year, these three entities or their representatives have worked in concert 
to address pressing ethical issues.291 There is no reason why they cannot 
Id. 
288. See CAL. EVID. CODE§ 911 (West 1995). 
289. See supra notes 241-50 and accompanying text. 
290. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 504. 
291. During 2000-2001, the California State Bar (authorized by a study bill, 
Assemby Bill 2069) worked through its Standing Committee on Professional 
Responsibility and Conduct (COPRAC) with various constituencies of the bar and 
representatives from the legislature and other interested parties, including representatives 
from the California Judicial Conference, to address the efficacy of California's 
tripartite insurance defense system. See Assemb. B. 2069, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2000), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/asm/ab_2051-
2l00/ab_2069 _bill_200009 l 8_chaptered.html. Further, during 2001, interested 
parties, including various constituencies of the bar, representatives of the legislature and 
Judicial Conference, and COPRAC cooperated in drafting a proposed amendment to 
Rule 3-600 to address the issue of government lawyer whisteblowers raised by Assembly 
Bill 363, which in tum sought to address issues raised by the Ossias-Quackenbush 
insurance matter. See State Bar of Cal., Member/Public Commellt: Proposed Amended 
Rule 3-600, available at http://www.calbar.org/2bar/3com/3cp0107.htm (last visited Apr. 
24, 2002); See supra note 281 and accompanying text. After a public comment period, 
the rule returned to COPRAC, which made further modifications. On January 26, 2002, 
the State Bar of California's Board of Governors voted to transmit the proposed 
amendments to Rule 3-600 to the California Supreme Court for its consideration. 
The proposed rule and supporting documents were forwarded to the supreme court on 
February 27, 2002. See STATE BAR OF CAL., REQUEST THAT THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA APPROVE AMENDMENTS TO RULE 3-600 OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
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again cooperate to finally bring California in line with other states in 
having a life-threatening criminal activity exception to the duty of 
confidentiality. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
California's law concerning lawyer confidentiality and the ability of 
its lawyers to reveal confidential information to prevent life-threatening 
criminal activity remains somewhat murky, notwithstanding several 
attempts by the California State Bar to fashion a rule of professional 
conduct that would unequivocally permit such disclosures. In light of 
the recent publication of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers and revisions to the ABA's Model Rules, both of which make 
strong statements favoring such disclosures, it is time for California to 
join the rest of the states. Whether by modifying the duty of 
confidentiality statute, by rule of professional conduct, or by an 
unambiguous statement of the California Supreme Court, California 
should state unequivocally that lawyers will not be subject to discipline 
if they reveal confidential client information for the narrow purpose of 
preventing criminal activity reasonably likely to cause death or serious 
bodily harm. 
CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, AND MEMORANDUM AND SUPPORTING 
DOCUMENTS IN EXPLANATION (2002), available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar 
/pdfs/rule3-600request.pdf. On May 10, 2002, however, the California Supreme 
Court denied the request for a rule amendment with the following explanation: "The 
State Bar Board of Governors' request to adopt amendments to the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, rule 3-600, is denied because the proposed modifications conflict with B & P 
Code 6068, (e)." California Appellate Courts, Docket Entries (Register of Actions), 
http:/ /appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_id= I 94954&case 
=S 104682 (last visited May 22, 2002). Despite the participation of interested parties 
from a wide spectrum working together to craft a solution to the concerns identified in 
the Quackenbush-Ossias matter, the supreme court ultimately determined that an 
amendment to rule 3-600 could not avoid the harsh realities of Business and Professions 
Code section 6068(e). This disposition of the matter, perhaps predictable given 
California's unique system of professional regulation, see supra Part III.A., does not 
necessarily mean that diverse constituencies cannot cooperate to shape ethics rules. It 
does suggest, however, that so long as a logical disconnect between the Business and 
Professions Code section 6068(e) and Evidence Code section 956.5 exists, it will be 
difficult if not impossible to amend the duty of confidentiality in California. The 
supreme court's decision on the request to amend rule 3-600 instead demonstrates the 
efficacy of the foregoing proposal: to transfer the duty of confidentiality to a rule of 
professional conduct. The different groups have worked well together; they should be 
able to cooperate again to accomplish the worthwhile goal of giving California an 
unambiguous statement on a life-threatening criminal activity exception to the duty of 
confidentiality. 
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